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Of Banks, Federalism and  
Clear Statement Rules: Bank of 
Montreal v. Marcotte 
Wade K. Wright* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution Act, 18671 gives Parliament “exclusive” legislative 
power over “Banking” and the “Incorporation of Banks” (section 91(15)). 
Banks in Canada have regularly made division of powers arguments 
invoking this federal legislative power in an attempt to avoid provincial 
laws.2 In earlier cases, their efforts were often (but not always) 
successful.3 However, the tide recently seems to have turned against 
                                                                                                                       
* SSHRC Postdoctoral Fellow, Faculty of Law and University College, University of 
Toronto; LL.B. (Osgoode Hall); LL.M. (Cambridge); and J.S.D. (Columbia). Thanks are due to 
Peter Hogg, Robin Elliot and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. 
1 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. 
2 Bradley Crawford, The Law of Banking and Payment in Canada (Aurora, ON: Canada 
Law Book, 2008) [hereinafter “Crawford”], 8.10 (noting banks have claimed “exemption from many 
provincial laws”). 
3 See, e.g., Tennant v. Union Bank of Canada, [1893] J.C.J. No. 1, [1894] A.C. 31 (P.C.) 
(federal law permitting banks to take security by way of “warehouse receipts” constitutionally valid; 
provincial law limiting their legal effect not given effect); Canada (Attorney General) v. Quebec 
(Attorney General), [1947] Q.C. 33 (P.C.) (bank and Attorney General of Canada successfully 
invoking constitutional argument against a Quebec law confiscating all deposits in “credit 
institutions”  mostly banks  that had not been claimed for 30 years); Bank of Montreal v. Hall, 
[1990] S.C.J. No. 9, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121 (S.C.C.) (bank successfully invoking constitutional 
argument to avoid a provincial law regulating the enforcement of a security interest); Bank of Nova 
Scotia v. Canada (Superintendent of Financial Institutions), [2003] B.C.J. No. 92, 11 B.C.L.R. (4th) 
206 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 229, [2003] 3 S.C.R. viii 
(bank successfully invoking constitutional argument to avoid a provincial law imposing 
requirements on promotion of insurance). See also Reference re: Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.J. 
No. 2, [1938] S.C.R. 100 (S.C.C.) (banks intervening in a reference striking down Alberta legislation 
creating a new form of credit); and Alberta (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1938] 
J.C.J. No. 3, [1939] A.C. 117 (Alta. P.C.) (banks intervening in a reference striking down Alberta 
legislation levying a heavy tax on banks). 
For cases sustaining provincial laws in relation to banks, see, e.g., Bank of Toronto v. Lambe 
(1887), 12 A.C. 575 (P.C.) (bank subject to provincial taxation); Royal Bank of Canada v. Nova 
Scotia (Workers/Workmen’s Compensation Board), [1936] S.C.J. No. 36, [1936] S.C.R. 560 
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them. In Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta (2007),4 the Supreme Court 
of Canada held that the promotion of insurance by banks is subject to the 
consumer protection requirements in Alberta’s insurance legislation. And 
most recently, in Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte (2014),5 the Court 
extended its reasoning in Canadian Western Bank, holding that the credit 
card activities of banks are also subject to provincial consumer protection 
requirements. The decisions, taken together, seem to give the provinces 
broad scope to regulate the activities of banks.  
The loss in Marcotte seems especially striking, because the Court 
gave short shrift to a new preamble that had been added to the federal 
Bank Act6 by the Harper government in 2012.7 The preamble provides 
that “it is desirable and is in the national interest to provide for clear, 
comprehensive, exclusive national standards applicable to banking 
products and banking services offered by banks”.8 The preamble was 
lobbied for by the banks,9 at least in part in response, it would seem, to 
the decision of the trial judge in Marcotte,10 which ordered nine banks to 
pay restitution and (in some cases) punitive damages of almost $200 
million for breaching the credit card disclosure requirements in Quebec’s 
Consumer Protection Act.11 The trial judge had rejected the banks’ 
arguments that the CPA was constitutionally inapplicable under the 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity (because its application would 
                                                                                                                       
(S.C.C.) (property assigned to a bank as security subject to provincial taxation); and Gregory Co. v. 
Imperial Bank of Canada, [1960] C.S. 204 (Que. C.S.) (bank subject to provincial securities laws). 
4 [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”]. 
5 [2014] S.C.J. No. 55, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725, 2014 SCC 55 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Marcotte”]. Marcotte was one of three companion cases. The other two cases are: Amex Bank of 
Canada v. Adams, [2014] S.C.J. No. 56, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 787, 2014 SCC 56 (S.C.C.); and Marcotte 
v. Fédération des caisses Desjardins du Québec, [2014] S.C.J. No. 57, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 805, 2014 
SCC 57 (S.C.C.). This article will focus on the Court’s decision in Marcotte, because it is the lead 
decision, including on the constitutional analysis. 
6 S.C. 1991, c. 46 [hereinafter “Bank Act”]. 
7 The preamble was added to the Act by the Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, 
S.C. 2012, c. 19, s. 525 [hereinafter “Preamble”], the Harper government’s 452-page 2012 omnibus 
budget bill. For further discussion of the Court’s treatment of the preamble, see Part III(2), below. 
8 Id. (emphasis added). 
9 See, e.g., Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and 
Commerce (June 7, 2012) (comments of Senators Céline Hervieux-Payette and Carolyn Stewart-
Olsen) (noting the Canadian Bankers Association lobbied for the amendment), online: 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/sen/committee/411%5CBANC/20EV-49618-e.HTM>. The Canadian 
Bankers Association intervened in the Supreme Court to argue against the constitutional 
applicability and operability of the CPA to the banks. 
10 In yet another twist, the trial judge was Gascon J., who was later appointed by the Harper 
government to the Quebec Court of Appeal, then to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
11 CQLR, c. P-40.1 [hereinafter “CPA”]. 
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impair the “core” of the “exclusive” federal banking power) or 
constitutionally inoperative under the doctrine of federal paramountcy 
(because its operation would conflict with a federal purpose to create 
exclusive federal standards for banks).12 The preamble’s call for 
“exclusive national standards” was rebuffed in the decisions of the 
Quebec Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, both of which held that 
banks were required to comply with the relevant federal and provincial 
“standards”.13 
This article explores the Supreme Court’s decision in Marcotte. It 
argues that the Court was right to reject the banks’ argument that the 
CPA “standards” were constitutionally inapplicable under the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity or constitutionally inoperative under the 
doctrine of federal paramountcy. However, it challenges aspects of the 
reasoning provided for this result. It argues the weaknesses in the Court’s 
reasoning could be addressed (or mitigated) by a federalism-based clear 
statement rule. A federalism-based clear statement rule, a concept 
described in more detail below, requires a government to use clear 
language when it pursues initiatives with certain implications for the 
division of powers.14  
The article is organized in two parts. Part II describes the basic issues 
and decisions in Marcotte, with an emphasis on the decision of the Court. 
Part III engages critically with the Court’s decision in Marcotte, 
beginning with its discussion of the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity, then turning to its discussion of the doctrine of federal 
paramountcy. The discussion of each doctrine considers how, and why, a 
federalism-based clear statement rule might be utilized to modify the 
Court’s current analysis.  
                                                                                                                       
12 The number of banks held liable was reduced on appeal, as was the dollar amount of 
their liability. For further discussion of the various decisions, see Part II(2) & (3), below.  
13 The decision joins a growing list of recent decisions in which the Court has  rejected 
constitutional arguments advanced by the Harper government that would have permitted it to 
proceed unilaterally with initiatives that implicate the federal system: see Reference re 
Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Securities 
Reference”] (rejecting proposed national securities regulator opposed by various provinces); 
Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6 , [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 433 
(S.C.C.) (rejecting unilateral federal reform of the Court); and Reference re Senate Reform, 
[2014] S.C.J. No. 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704 (S.C.C.) (rejecting proposed unilateral federal 
reforms of the Senate). 
14 See the text accompanying note 139, below. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF MARCOTTE 
1. Background 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Marcotte was the culmination of a 
hard fought Quebec class action that began 11 years earlier. The original 
representative plaintiff in the class action was Réal Marcotte.15 The 
defendants in the class action were a group of nine banks.16 The focus of 
the class action was the “conversion charge” that the banks charge their 
cardholders when they use their credit cards to make purchases in foreign 
currencies.17 The primary allegation was that the banks had violated the 
requirements that Quebec’s consumer protection law, the CPA, imposed 
on the calculation, collection and disclosure of these sorts of charges. 
The class action was for restitution of the conversion charges and 
punitive damages, remedies available under the CPA, but not the federal 
banking scheme.18 
The plaintiffs made essentially three main allegations. First, they 
alleged that the banks breached the CPA by failing to calculate, collect 
and disclose the conversion charges as “credit charges”. Under the CPA, 
“credit charges” must be folded into the “credit rate” (the interest rate), 
                                                                                                                       
15 A second representative plaintiff, Bernard Laparé, was added for standing reasons. 
16 The nine banks were: Bank of Montreal (“BMO”), Amex Bank of Canada (“Amex”), 
Royal Bank of Canada (“RBC”), Toronto-Dominion Bank (“TD”), Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce (“CIBC”), Bank of Nova Scotia (“Scotiabank”), National Bank of Canada (“NBC”), 
Laurentian Bank of Canada (“Laurentian”) and Citibank Canada (“Citibank”). 
The first class action (Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte, the focus of this article) initially included 
a claim against Desjardins, Quebec’s largest credit union. A separate second class action was later 
initiated against Desjardins (Marcotte v. Fédération des caisses Desjardins du Québec), and the 
claim against Desjardins in the first class action dropped, after the banks indicated that they would 
challenge the constitutional applicability and operability of the CPA; the first class action and second 
class action were heard jointly (by Gascon J.). A third (but related) class action was later 
commenced against Amex (Amex Bank of Canada v. Adams). The third class action was heard 
shortly after the hearing of the other two class actions (also by Gascon J.). The decisions in all three 
class actions were released on the same day. The appeals of the three class actions  which dealt 
with similar issues  were heard together, in both the Quebec Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court of Canada. 
17 When credit card holders make purchases in foreign currencies, the payment amount is 
converted from the foreign currency into Canadian dollars using “interbank rates”, which are rates 
that are generally not available to cardholders. The issuer of the credit card then charges an 
additional “conversion charge” that is added to the converted amount in the form of a percentage of 
the converted amount (typically 1.5 per cent to 2.5 per cent of this amount). 
18 See the Bank Act, supra, note 6, above; the Cost of Borrowing (Banks) Regulations, 
SOR/2001-101. See also the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada Act, S.C. 2001, c. 9. 
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and disclosed as an annual percentage.19 The federal regulatory regime 
requires separate disclosure of conversion charges. Second, the plaintiffs 
alleged that, as “credit charges”, the conversion charges levied by the 
banks were subject to a 21-day grace period, meaning that they could not 
be claimed from cardholders who paid off their monthly balance during 
the grace period. The federal regulatory scheme allows banks to collect 
conversion charges without a grace period. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged 
that in some cases there was not only a failure to respect the specific 
CPA requirements relating to “credit charges”, but also a failure to 
disclose the conversion charges at all, a breach of the CPA’s general 
disclosure requirement (section 12). 
The banks made various arguments in response.20 The most salient 
for the purposes of this article are their constitutional arguments. The 
banks argued that the relevant consumer protection requirements in the 
CPA were constitutionally inapplicable in relation to bank-issued credit 
cards due to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. The banks also 
argued that, even if applicable, the consumer protection requirements in 
the CPA were constitutionally inoperative in relation to bank-issued 
credit cards due to the doctrine of federal paramountcy.21 The 
constitutional arguments of the banks (and the plaintiffs’ response to 
them) are described in more detail below, in the description of the 
Supreme Court’s decision. 
The constitutional arguments of the banks intersected with one of the 
other key points of disagreement in the case. This was whether the 
conversion charges were properly characterized as “credit charges” for 
the purposes of the CPA. The CPA draws a distinction between “credit 
charges” and “net capital”, imposing distinct requirements on each. The 
plaintiffs, as noted, argued that the conversion charges were properly 
characterized as “credit charges”, and therefore must be included in the 
disclosed “credit rate”, and subjected to a 21-day grace period. The 
banks argued that the conversion charges were properly characterized as 
“net capital”, and therefore were not subject to the CPA requirements 
relating to “credit charges”.22 This article will not analyze the various 
                                                                                                                       
19 There is a possible exception for conversion charges included in an annual fee: see 
Fédération des caisses Desjardins du Québec c. Marcotte, [2012] J.Q. no 7427, 2012 QCCA 1395, 
at para. 24 (Que. C.A.). 
20 The banks also made a standing argument, resulting in an important statement from the 
Supreme Court on the issue. This article will not analyze this aspect of the case. 
21 For further discussion of both doctrines, including their role, see Part II(3), below. 
22 The Court summed up the distinction between the two concepts as follows: “If the 
conversion charge qualifies as a credit charge, then according to the CPA it would have to be 
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decisions as they relate to this issue in any detail; the distinction between 
“credit charge” and “net capital” is technical and complex. However, it is 
important to note that the characterization of the conversion charges did 
have implications for the constitutional analysis. This is because the 
federal and provincial requirements differ much more if the conversion 
charges are characterized as “credit charges” under the CPA, in the least 
increasing the odds of finding a conflict sufficient to trigger the federal 
paramountcy doctrine.23 
2. The Lower Court Decisions 
The Quebec Superior Court found for the plaintiffs.24 The trial judge 
(Gascon J.) held that the conversion charges were properly characterized 
as “credit charges” under the CPA. He then rejected the banks’ argument 
that the CPA requirements were constitutionally inapplicable due to the 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, or constitutionally inoperative 
due to the doctrine of federal paramountcy. Applying the CPA, he held 
that all nine banks failed to respect the CPA requirements relating to 
“credit charges” in calculating, collecting and disclosing the conversion 
charges, and that five banks also failed to disclose the conversion charges 
at all during certain periods, breaching the CPA’s general disclosure 
requirement.25 He ordered the nine banks to reimburse the conversion 
charges collected in breach of the CPA requirements; he also ordered the 
five banks that failed to disclose the conversion charges during certain 
periods to pay punitive damages. The total amount ordered (re)paid by 
the nine banks was close to $200 million. 
The banks appealed to the Quebec Court of Appeal. The Court 
reversed the trial judge’s decision in part, but sustained his conclusion 
rejecting the banks’ constitutional arguments.26 The Court rejected the 
                                                                                                                       
disclosed on its own, included in the disclosed credit rate, and be subject to the 21-day grace period. 
If the conversion charge qualifies as net capital, it would not be included in the credit rate or be 
subject to the 21-day grace period, but would still have to be disclosed under the general s. 12 
disclosure provision of the CPA.”: Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 50. 
23 This point was made by the Court of Appeal: see the text accompanying note 27, below. 
The Supreme Court hinted at a similar idea: Marcotte, supra, note 5, at paras. 74-76, 80. 
24 Marcotte c. Banque de Montréal, [2009] J.Q. no 5771, 2009 QCCS 2764 (Que. C.S.). 
25 The result was that five banks (BMO, NBC, Citibank, TD and Amex) were held to have 
breached both the CPA’s specific requirements relating to “credit charges” and its general disclosure 
requirement, while four banks (RBC, CIBC, Scotiabank and Laurentian) were held only to have 
breached the CPA’s specific “credit charge” requirements. 
26 Banque de Montréal c. Marcotte, [2012] J.Q. no 7428, 2012 QCCA 1396 (Que. C.A.). 
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banks’ argument that the relevant CPA requirements were constitutionally 
inapplicable due to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. It 
suggested that it might have accepted the banks’ argument that the relevant 
CPA requirements were constitutionally inoperative due to the doctrine of 
federal paramountcy, if the conversion charges were properly 
characterized as “credit charges”, since the federal and provincial schemes 
would then have conflicted.27 However, it held that the conversion charges 
were properly characterized as “net capital”, not as “credit charges”, and 
so it rejected this argument as well, concluding that the federal and 
provincial schemes then did not conflict, but “work[ed] together 
harmoniously”.28 The Court’s conclusion that the conversion charges were 
not “credit charges” led it to a different outcome than the trial judge. The 
Court dismissed the claims entirely against four banks (which had 
disclosed the conversion charges, and so had been held only to have 
breached the CPA requirements relating to “credit charges”), but affirmed 
the finding against four banks (which had not disclosed the conversion 
charges at all during the relevant period, breaching the CPA’s general 
disclosure requirement).29 It also reduced the amount of the order, to 
reflect its conclusion that the conversion charges were not “credit 
charges”, and reversed the order for punitive damages.30  
3. The Supreme Court Decision 
The banks appealed again to the Supreme Court. The plaintiffs also 
appealed, primarily to have the trial judge’s original remedy restored. 
Justices Rothstein and Wagner, writing for the Court, denied the banks’ 
appeal,31 affirming the Court of Appeal’s decision that the banks did not 
need to comply with the CPA requirements relating to “credit charges”, 
since the conversion charges were “net capital”, but that five of the nine 
banks had nonetheless still breached the CPA’s general disclosure 
                                                                                                                       
27 Id., paras. 104-106. The Court also noted another potential conflict in paras. 107-109, 
between the federal provision requiring consumer complaints against banks to be filed with the 
Financial Consumer Agency of Canada, and the CPA provisions allowing them to be filed with the 
Quebec equivalent  the Office de la protection du consommateur. 
28 Id., at para. 106. 
29 The Court also dismissed the claim against Amex, but only because it was already 
covered by its decision in Adams v. Amex Bank of Canada, [2012] Q.J. No. 7426, 2012 QCCA 1394 
(Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Adams”]. 
30 However, the punitive damages award against TD was affirmed. 
31 Marcotte, supra, note 5. 
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requirement.32 However, the Court allowed the plaintiffs’ appeal in part, 
restoring the trial judge’s punitive damages award against the five banks. 
In reaching this result, the Court joined both of the lower courts in 
rejecting the banks’ arguments that the relevant CPA requirements were 
constitutionally inapplicable under the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity, or constitutionally inoperative under the doctrine of federal 
paramountcy. 
I will now explore the Court’s reasoning about both doctrines. 
(a)  The Doctrine of Interjurisdictional Immunity 
A law that is in “pith and substance” within the jurisdiction of the 
legislature that enacted it may validly have an “incidental” impact on 
matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the other order of 
government.33 One exception is where the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity applies. It operates to prevent a law that is otherwise valid 
under the pith and substance doctrine from applying if the law has an 
impermissible impact on matters that fall within a core of jurisdiction 
reserved for the other order of government. Where the doctrine applies, 
the relevant law is not struck down as invalid; rather, it is “read down”, 
meaning it is interpreted so as not to apply to the extrajurisdictional 
matter. The Court has developed a two-step test that it applies in 
determining whether the doctrine is engaged: the first step determines 
whether the impugned law engages the protected “core” of a legislative 
power allocated to the other order of government; the second step 
determines whether applying the impugned law would “significantly 
trammel” or “impair” the manner in which this “core” can be exercised.34 
The banks argued that the relevant CPA requirements were 
constitutionally inapplicable, under the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity, because lending and foreign currency conversion by banks 
(including by credit card) lie at the core of Parliament’s “exclusive” 
jurisdiction over “banking”, and the application of the CPA requirements 
                                                                                                                       
32 The Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision that the claim against Amex in this 
case should be dismissed since it overlapped with the claim against Amex in Adams, supra, note 29, 
so it partly restored the order against Amex: id., at paras. 114-116. 
33 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 
2007), c. 15 [hereinafter “Hogg”]. 
34 Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn., [2010] S.C.J. No. 39, 
[2010] 2 S.C.R. 536, at paras. 27, 43-45 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “COPA”]. This two-step test was 
affirmed by the Court in Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 63. There are uncertainties about the 
contours of the test, which are discussed below, in Part III(1). 
(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) BANK OF MONTREAL V. MARCOTTE 199 
would impair “Parliament’s power to regulate a national banking system 
under exclusive federal control”.35 The application of the relevant CPA 
requirements would, they argued, “submit the core of Parliament’s 
banking power and its unified regulatory authority over the national 
banking system to comprehensive provincial regulatory oversight and 
control”,36 impairing Parliament’s banking power, by narrowing its 
legislative options, and “requiring it to specifically override provincial 
laws across Canada”.37 The banks relied heavily on the Court’s recent 
decision in Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn. (2010),38 which, they 
said, clearly established that the “impairment” test would be satisfied if 
the “application of provincial law would … ‘narrow Parliament’s 
legislative options’”.39 
The plaintiffs argued that the relevant CPA requirements were not 
constitutionally inapplicable under the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity. They argued that lending and foreign currency conversion by 
banks (including by credit card) did not lie at the protected core of 
Parliament’s power over banking, and that, even if they did, the 
application of the CPA requirements would not impair this protected 
core. They accused the banks of attempting to reargue Canadian Western 
Bank40  a case, also involving a group of banks, and discussed in more 
detail below, in which the Court explicitly discouraged “intensive 
reliance on the doctrine”, and embraced several changes aimed at 
restricting its role.41  
Justices Rothstein and Wagner, as noted earlier, rejected the 
argument of the banks that the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity 
was engaged by the CPA requirements. They confirmed that 
“interjurisdictional immunity remains an extant constitutional doctrine”.42 
However, invoking Canadian Western Bank, they suggested that “[a] 
broad application of the doctrine is in tension with the modern 
cooperative approach to federalism which favours, where possible, the 
application of statutes enacted by both levels of government”, and thus 
                                                                                                                       
35 Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte, [2014] S.C.J. No. 55, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725, 2014 SCC 55 
(S.C.C.) (Appellant banks’ factum) [hereinafter “Marcotte (Appellant banks’ factum)”], at para. 4. 
36 Id., at para. 64. 
37 Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte, [2014] S.C.J. No. 55, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725, 2014 SCC 55 
(S.C.C.) (Respondent banks’ factum) [hereinafter “Marcotte (Respondent banks’ factum)”], at para. 67. 
38 COPA, supra, note 34. 
39 Marcotte (Respondent banks’ factum), supra, note 37, at paras. 66-67 (emphasis added). 
40 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4. 
41 Id., at paras. 35-44. For more discussion of the decision, see Part III(1), below. 
42 Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 63. 
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that the “doctrine must be applied ‘with restraint’ and ‘should in general 
be reserved for situations already covered by precedent’”.43 
Justices Rothstein and Wagner then affirmed and applied the two-
step interjurisdictional immunity test described earlier. They did not 
provide a conclusive answer as to whether lending and foreign currency 
conversion by banks in the credit card context fall within the core of the 
federal banking power, the first step of the test.44 Rather, they focused on 
the second step, concluding that applying the CPA requirements to banks 
would “not impair the federal banking power”.45 They suggested that 
“[r]equiring banks to inform customers of how their relationship will be 
governed or be subject to certain remedies does not limit banks’ abilities 
to dictate the terms of that relationship or otherwise limit their activities”, 
and that “even if foreign currency conversion is accepted as being part of 
the core of the federal banking power, imposing a broad disclosure 
requirement for charges relating to currency conversion in no way 
impairs that power”.46 They chided the banks for arguing “for exactly the 
type of amorphous, sweeping immunity that was rejected in Canadian 
Western Bank”, stating that “banks cannot avoid the application of all 
provincial statutes that in any way touch on their operations, including 
lending and currency conversion”.47 
(b)  The Doctrine of Federal Paramountcy  
The doctrine of federal paramountcy applies where overlapping and 
otherwise valid federal and provincial laws conflict. Where the doctrine 
applies, the provincial law is not struck down; rather, it is rendered 
inoperative to the extent of the conflict. There are two forms of conflict 
that engage the doctrine: operational conflicts and conflicts of purpose. 
There is an operational conflict (the first form of conflict) where it is not 
possible to comply simultaneously with both the federal and provincial 
laws  where “compliance with one is defiance of the other”.48 There is 
a conflict of purpose (the second form of conflict) where compliance 
                                                                                                                       
43 Id., at paras. 66-67 (citing Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4). 
44 They did note that “lending, broadly defined, is central to banking and has been 
recognized as such by this Court in previous decisions”, but also said “there is no precedent for the 
doctrine’s application to the credit card activities of banks”: Id., at paras. 63, 66. 
45 Id., at para. 66. 
46 Id. 
47 Id., at para. 68. 
48 Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] S.C.J. No. 66, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161,  
at 191 (S.C.C.). 
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with the provincial law would, in effect, frustrate the purpose of the 
overlapping federal law. 
The banks argued that allowing the CPA requirements to operate in 
relation to the banks would frustrate the purpose of the federal banking 
scheme  the second form of conflict. Justices Rothstein and Wagner 
rejected this argument. They emphasized that “care must be taken not to 
give too broad a scope to paramountcy on the basis of frustration of 
federal purpose”, and that “[t]he mere fact that Parliament has legislated 
in an area does not preclude provincial legislation from operating in the 
same area”.49 
The banks argued that two different federal purposes would be 
frustrated by the operation of the CPA requirements. First, they argued that 
the CPA requirements would frustrate Parliament’s general purpose to 
subject “bank-issued credit cards ... to one and only one set of consumer 
protection rules”.50 As noted, they pointed, in support of this argument, to 
the preamble to the federal Bank Act, which refers to “exclusive, national 
standards”.51 Justices Rothstein and Wagner cast doubt on the banks’ 
argument that the preamble could be used to help establish a federal 
purpose to provide for exclusive federal standards; they noted that the 
preamble was added to the Act in 2012, before the Court of Appeal issued 
its decision, and the “proposition that it [could] be used retroactively as an 
interpretative aid” was, they suggested, “dubious”.52 However, they 
insisted that a federal purpose to provide for “exclusive national  
standards”  even if it was a federal purpose  “would still not be 
frustrated” by the operation of the CPA requirements.53 The reason was 
that the CPA requirements “do not provide for ‘standards applicable to 
banking products and banking services offered by banks’, but rather 
articulate a contractual norm in Quebec”  just like the “substantive rules 
of contract found in the [Civil Code of Quebec], the operation of which the 
                                                                                                                       
49 Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 72. 
50 Marcotte (Appellant banks’ factum), supra, note 35, at para. 6. 
51 Bank Act, supra, note 6 (emphasis added). The banks also invoked other materials to 
support their argument that a federal purpose was to provide for exclusive national standards: 
Marcotte (Appellant banks’ factum), supra, note 35, at para. 79. The Attorney General of Canada 
supported the banks’ argument as to a federal purpose to provide for exclusive national standards, 
also invoking the preamble and other materials in support: Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte, [2014] 
S.C.J. No. 55, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725, 2014 SCC 55 (Attorney General of Canada’s factum), at paras. 
90-101 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Marcotte (Attorney General of Canada’s factum)”]. 
52 Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 78 (citing United States of America v. Dynar, [1997] 
S.C.J. No. 64, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 462, at paras. 45-46 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dynar”]). 
53 Id., at para. 78. 
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Banks do not dispute”.54 They accepted that the result might have been 
different if the federal and provincial requirements varied,55 but maintained 
that the requirements here were “the same”; and mere “duplication is not, 
on its own, enough to trigger paramountcy”.56 
Second, the banks also argued that the CPA requirements would 
frustrate a more specific federal purpose: “to ensure that bank contracts 
are not nullified even if a bank breaches its disclosure obligations”, and 
to provide for administrative and criminal remedies instead of civil 
remedies in the event of a breach.57 The CPA provides consumers “with 
various civil remedies for breaches of the Act, including specific 
performance, reduction of the consumer’s obligation and rescission or 
annulment of the contract, as well as for punitive damages”.58 The 
federal scheme, in contrast, expressly rules out contract nullification as a 
remedy for breach, and provides for administrative and criminal 
remedies in the event of a breach, but is silent as to civil remedies. 
Justices Rothstein and Wagner suggested that it was “enough” to dismiss 
the banks’ argument about nullification “to note that the remedy sought 
by the Plaintiffs is a reduction of how much they paid to the Banks, not 
[contract] nullification”.59 They dismissed the banks’ argument about 
administrative and criminal remedies by noting that “[t]he silence of the 
Bank Act on civil remedies cannot be taken to mean that civil remedies 
are inconsistent with the Bank Act, absent a conflict”.60 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Court, in my view, was right to reject the constitutional 
arguments of the banks in Marcotte. As the Court has acknowledged in a 
variety of recent decisions, including in Marcotte, the courts should 
                                                                                                                       
54 Id., at para. 79. 
55 They suggested that the doctrine of federal paramountcy might be engaged, due to an 
operative conflict or a conflict of purpose, if it was a “provincial requirement that conversion 
charges be calculated or disclosed in a different manner than that required by federal law”; if “the 
province provided for a different grace period”; or if the province provided for a “different method 
of interest computation or disclosure”: id., at para. 80. However, they suggested that none of these 
conflicts existed on the facts of the case. 
56 Id., at para. 80. 
57 Id., at para. 82. 
58 Id., at para. 76. 
59 Id., at para. 83. However, they noted that the doctrine of federal paramountcy might be 
engaged in a future case if the CPA “is applied to nullify a contract on the basis of a breach of a CPA 
provision that is similar to a provision of the Bank Act”: id. 
60 Id., at para. 84. 
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“favour, where possible, the application [and operation] of statutes 
enacted by both levels of government”.61 It was “possible” here to 
“favour … the application [and operation] of [the consumer protection 
laws] of both levels of government”, leaving potential conflicts to be 
worked out in future cases. 
It is noteworthy that many banks had already been complying with 
provincial consumer protection laws for many years, at least to some 
extent, including, it seems, in the credit card context.62 It is also 
noteworthy that the preamble invoked by the banks and the federal 
government in arguing for “exclusive national standards” was added to the 
Bank Act by the federal government only in 2012, decades after the first 
consumer protection legislation was enacted63  and only then, it would 
seem, after lobbying by the banks.64 The practice of dual compliance by 
the banks, a practice that the federal government did not seem inclined to 
disrupt until recently,65 suggests that the two schemes can operate in 
                                                                                                                       
61 Id., at para. 63. See also Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at para. 37; Chatterjee v. 
Ontario (Attorney General), [2009] S.C.J. No. 19, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 624, at para. 2 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Chatterjee”]; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] S.C.J. No. 38, [2010] 2 
S.C.R. 453, at para. 107 (S.C.C.), per Deschamps J., dissenting [hereinafter “Lacombe”]; Marine 
Services International Ltd. v. Ryan Estate, [2013] S.C.J. No. 44, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 53, at para. 50 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ryan Estate”]; and Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 
[2014] 2 S.C.R. 257, 2014 SCC 44, at para. 149 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in”]. 
62 Bradley Crawford, a leading authority on banking law in Canada, suggests that the ability 
of the provinces to apply their consumer protection laws to the banks was disputed, but that the 
federal and provincial governments and banks chose not to seek a judicial resolution, opting instead 
for an “informal truce” that “prevailed for about 40 years”: “the banks adhered to the federal 
requirements, but used their best efforts to comply with local variations in disclosure obligations as 
well; and the provincial attorneys general refrained from complaint”. This “informal truce”, he 
suggests, collapsed after the trial decision in Marcotte. See Crawford, supra, note 2, 8.20.30(1)(d) 
(emphasis added), and 8.20.30 (noting the parties worked out a “workable solution, rather than 
litigating the issues”). 
See also Canada, Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Financial Services Sector: Change 
Challenge Opportunity (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1998), 122 (noting that the “constitutional 
authority [of the provinces] to regulate consumer protection for banks is not fully defined, but many 
banks comply with provincial regulations”) (emphasis added). 
63 For a brief history of consumer protection law in Canada, see Jacob Ziegel, “Consumer 
Law and Policies Forty Years Later: A Mixed Report Card” (2011) 50 Can. Bus. L.J. 259. 
64 For more discussion of the preamble, see notes 7 and 9, above, and Part III(2), below. 
65 The federal government did work with the provinces in an attempt to harmonize the 
federal and provincial regimes. There was disagreement about whether this reflected an 
understanding that only the federal scheme would apply to banks, or might have reflected an implicit 
acknowledgment that the federal and provincial regimes did or could apply: compare,  
e.g., Marcotte (Attorney General of Canada’s factum), supra, note 51, at para. 95 (Attorney General 
of Canada asserting initiative premised on only the federal scheme applying to banks); and Marcotte 
(Appellant banks’ factum), supra, note 35, at paras. 79, 82 (similar argument); with Bank of 
Montreal v. Marcotte, [2014] S.C.J. No. 55, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725, 2014 SCC 55, at paras. 71-74 
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relation to banks without  as the banks implied  unduly compromising 
the “integrity of the national banking system”.66 The attempt by the banks 
to invoke the division of powers to avoid provincial consumer protection 
laws is an understandable response to the claim in Marcotte  which, 
after all, included a sizeable monetary claim, and threatened to open the 
banks to similar cases in other provinces. However, the Court was correct, 
I think, to reject their attempt. 
And yet, while I agree with the result in Marcotte on the 
constitutional issues, I do take issue with aspects of the reasoning 
provided by the Court for this result. This Part will explore the aspects of 
the Court’s reasoning in Marcotte with which I take issue, beginning 
with the Court’s discussion of the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity, and then turning to its discussion of the doctrine of federal 
paramountcy. I will argue that the problems that I identify could be 
addressed (or at least mitigated) by a federalism-based clear statement 
rule.67 The role that federalism-based clear statement rules could play in 
addressing (or mitigating) these problems warrants an article-length 
treatment, and so I will only sketch my argument in broad outline, 
leaving the details to be addressed in future work. I also leave for another 
day whether a federalism-based clear statement rule should be applied in 
cases involving the federal power over “Indians, and Lands reserved for 
the Indians” in section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
1. Interjurisdictional Immunity and Clear Statement 
(a)  Pre-Marcotte: Conflicting Signals 
The parties in Marcotte presented very different accounts of the scope 
of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. This might seem 
unsurprising; the banks were hoping to invoke the doctrine to avoid the 
application of the relevant provisions of the CPA, while the plaintiffs, 
whose case rested on the CPA, were arguing that the doctrine was not 
                                                                                                                       
(S.C.C.) (Respondent plaintiffs’ factum) [hereinafter “Marcotte (Respondent plaintiffs’ factum)”] 
(record “does not reveal that the federal government sought to exert exclusive jurisdiction over 
consumer protection for banks”). This tracked a broader disagreement about the jurisdictional and 
regulatory status quo pre-Marcotte. 
66 Marcotte (Appellant banks’ factum), supra, note 35, at paras. 3-4 (banks implying in 
written argument that failing to allow banks to avoid the application of provincial consumer 
protection laws would undermine “the integrity of the national banking system”). 
67 For a definition of the term, see the text accompanying note 139, below. 
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engaged. However, these different accounts were not the simple by-product 
of the cut and thrust of litigation; they both presented credible accounts of 
the Supreme Court’s recent cases defining and applying the doctrine.  
The parties were able to offer these accounts because the Court’s 
recent decisions have sent conflicting signals about the scope of the 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. In 2007, in Canadian Western 
Bank, the Court revisited the scope of the doctrine.68 A number of 
commentators  me included  suggested that the decision heralded a 
much more restricted role for the doctrine.69 However, the Court’s 
decisions about the doctrine have long had a “shifting and unpredictable 
character”.70 And so, it perhaps should not have come as a surprise that 
just three years later, in 2010, the Court released another decision 
(COPA)71 that seemed to herald a much less restricted role for the 
doctrine.72 Or that more recently, the Court released two more decisions 
 one in 2011 (Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services 
                                                                                                                       
68 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4. 
69 For my discussion of the decision, see Wade K. Wright, “Facilitating Intergovernmental 
Dialogue: Judicial Review of the Division of Powers in the Supreme Court of Canada” in  
J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2010) 51 S.C.L.R. (3d) 625, 629-50 [hereinafter “Wright”]. See also, 
e.g., Carissima Mathen & M. Plaxton, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 2006-2007 Term” 
(2007) 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 111, 131-36; Peter W. Hogg & Rahat Godil, “Narrowing Interjurisdictional 
Immunity” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 623 [hereinafter “Hogg & 
Godil”]; John G. Furey, “Interjurisdictional Immunity: The Pendulum Has Swung” in J. Cameron & 
B. Ryder, eds. (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 597 [hereinafter “Furey”]; E. Edinger, “Back to the Future 
with Interjurisdictional Immunity: Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta; British Columbia v. Lafarge 
Canada Inc.” (2008) 66 Adv. 553. See also Robin Elliot, “Interjurisdictional Immunity after 
Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge Canada Inc.: The Supreme Court Muddies the Doctrinal 
Waters – Again” (2008) 43 S.C.L.R. (2d) 433 [hereinafter “Elliot, 2008”] (criticizing the doctrinal 
modifications introduced). 
The decision was released with British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., 
[2007] S.C.J. No. 23, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lafarge”], which also heralded a 
restricted role for the doctrine. See also Chatterjee, supra, note 61, at para. 2 (affirming the rejection 
of “proliferating jurisdictional enclaves” in both decisions). 
70 Paul C. Weiler, “The Supreme Court and the Law of Canadian Federalism” (1973) 23 
U.T.L.J. 307, 340 [hereinafter “Weiler”]. For a characteristically succinct account of the twists and 
turns in the Court’s treatment of the doctrine over the years, see Hogg, supra, note 33, at 15.8. 
71 COPA, supra, note 34. 
72 The decision was released concurrently with Lacombe, supra, note 61. For a detailed 
discussion of both decisions, see Robin Elliot, “Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe and Quebec 
(Attorney General) v. C.O.P.A.: Ancillary Powers, Interjurisdictional Immunity and ‘The Local 
Interest in Land Use Planning against the National Interest in a Unified System of Aviation 
Navigation’” (2011) 55 S.C.L.R. (2d) 403 [hereinafter “Elliot, 2011”]. 
See also NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C. Government and Service 
Employees’ Union, [2010] S.C.J. No. 45, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 696 (S.C.C.) (majority, per Abella J., and 
concurrence, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J., disagreeing about whether to synthesize the labour 
relations and interjurisdictional immunity tests). 
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Society),73 the other in 2013 (Marine Services International Ltd. v. Ryan 
Estate)74  that appeared to retreat to the more restricted approach to the 
doctrine set out in Canadian Western Bank.75 These decisions send 
conflicting signals about the scope of the doctrine. 
The conflicting signals sent by the Court’s recent decisions about the 
scope of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity can be illustrated by 
comparing the Court’s decisions in Canadian Western Bank and COPA. 
The basic issue in Canadian Western Bank was whether banks that 
promoted insurance in Alberta were required to comply with the 
consumer protection requirements in Alberta’s Insurance Act. A group of 
banks argued that the provisions were constitutionally inapplicable due 
to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.76 Justices Binnie and 
LeBel, writing for the majority, rejected this argument.77 They took the 
opportunity in their decision to reflect at some length on the main 
division of powers doctrines, including the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity. In doing so, they laid out a restricted role for the doctrine, 
limiting its scope in several ways. 
First, they raised the threshold to engage the doctrine. They said that 
the doctrine would now be engaged only if the “basic, minimum and 
unassailable core” of a legislative power of one order of government (or 
a “vital or essential part of an undertaking it duly constitutes”) would be 
impaired by the application of the law enacted by the other order of 
government. Previously, the courts applied a lower affects threshold.78 
Second, they said that the doctrine should generally “be reserved for 
situations already covered by precedent”.79 They did not clarify precisely 
what this meant, but earlier in the decision, they reviewed the 
                                                                                                                       
73 [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”] (dispute 
involving the operation of Insite, a safe-injection clinic in Vancouver; Court rejecting an argument 
invoking the doctrine based on the alleged impairment of a protected core of provincial jurisdiction 
over health). See also Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 
331, 2015 SCC 5, at paras. 49-53 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Carter”] (involving a similar argument, with 
a similar result). 
74 Ryan Estate, supra, note 61 (statutory bar of action in provincial workers’ compensation 
legislation not constitutionally inapplicable). For discussion, see Jena McGill, “Developments in 
Constitutional Law: The 2013 Term” (2015) 68 S.C.L.R. (2d) 137, 141-52. 
75 The Court’s decision in Tsilhqot’in, supra, note 61, released post-hearing but pre-release 
of Marcotte, also confirms a more restricted role for the doctrine (at paras. 128-152). 
76 The banks also invoked the doctrine of federal paramountcy. 
77 Justice Bastarache wrote a concurring opinion disagreeing with aspects of their analysis. 
78 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at para. 48. They also rejected a distinction that 
had been drawn in an earlier case between direct and indirect application: id., at para. 49. 
79 Id., at para. 77. 
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“evolution” of the doctrine, suggesting that it originated in cases 
involving “federally incorporated companies”, and was later applied to 
federal “undertakings”,80 and then “things (e.g., Aboriginal lands) or 
persons (e.g., Aboriginal peoples ... )”.81 They noted that there were 
cases in which “the Court acknowledged that the doctrine could 
potentially apply to all ‘activities’ within Parliament’s jurisdiction”,82 an 
extension that, they argued, is supported by “the text and logic of our 
federal structure”.83 However, they suggested “a broad application of the 
doctrine to ‘activities’ creates practical problems of application much 
greater than in the case of works or undertakings, things or persons, 
whose limits are more readily defined”.84 
This more restrictive approach to the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity was appropriate, Binnie and LeBel JJ. said, because it was in line 
with the “dominant tide” of judicial review, which allows “for a fair amount 
of interplay and indeed overlap between federal and provincial powers”, and 
“favour[s], where possible, the ordinary operation of statutes enacted by 
both levels of government”.85 They suggested a less restrictive approach 
would thwart “the flexibility and co-ordination required by contemporary 
Canadian federalism”,86 harkening back to an idea expressed earlier in the 
decision, and affirmed regularly in later cases, that “constitutional doctrine 
must facilitate, not undermine … ‘co-operative federalism’”87  a model of 
federalism that embraces allocations and exercises of jurisdiction that are 
worked out through federal-provincial negotiation and agreement.88 
                                                                                                                       
80 The term “Undertaking” is used in the Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92(10). The term refers 
to businesses that Parliament has the jurisdiction to regulate. Examples include interprovincial “bus 
and truck lines, radio and television broadcasters, banks, airlines, shipping companies and [nuclear 
energy] companies”: Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 436. 
81 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at paras. 39-41. 
82 Id., at para. 41 (citing, e.g., Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] S.C.J. No. 84, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 
437 (S.C.C.)). 
83 Id., at paras. 41-42. 
84 Id., at para. 42. See also id., at para. 67 (“[a]lthough the doctrine is in principle applicable 
to all federal and provincial heads of legislative authority, the case law demonstrates that its natural 
area of operation is in relation to those heads of legislative authority that confer on Parliament power 
over enumerated federal things, people, works or undertakings”). 
85 Id., at paras. 36-37. 
86 Id., at paras. 42, 45. 
87 Id., at para. 24. For later references to “facilitating” “co-operative federalism”, see,  
e.g., Securities Reference, supra, note 13, at para. 60; PHS, supra, note 73, at para. 63; Tsilhqot’in, 
supra, note 61, at para. 149; and Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 84. 
88 I have explored this facilitative theory of judicial review (including what the Court seems 
to mean by “cooperative federalism”) in detail elsewhere: see Wright, supra, note 69; and Wade 
Kenneth Wright, “Beyond Umpire and Arbiter: Courts as Facilitators of Intergovernmental Dialogue 
 
208 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
There was disagreement among commentators about the merits of 
the Court’s decision, but there was general agreement that the decision 
heralded a more restricted role for the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity.89 And yet, just three years later, the Court’s decision in 
COPA90 seemed to give the doctrine a much more “robust application”.91 
At issue in COPA was a Quebec law that designated areas of the 
province as agricultural zones, prohibiting the use of land in the zones 
for non-agricultural purposes without prior approval from a provincial 
body. An aerodrome was built on private land in a designated 
agricultural zone without prior approval, and the provincial body, upon 
learning about the aerodrome, ordered it removed. (The federal 
Aeronautics Act,92 the federal regulatory scheme, did not require 
regulatory approval to establish or operate a private aerodrome.) The 
owners of the land challenged this decision on constitutional grounds, 
including by raising an argument that the provincial law could not apply 
to regulate the location of an aerodrome, by virtue of the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity, because it encroached impermissibly on 
federal jurisdiction over “aeronautics”.93 
Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for a seven-judge majority of the 
Court, accepted this argument, holding the provincial law was 
“inapplicable to the extent that it prohibits aerodromes in agricultural 
zones”.94 She acknowledged that it was the “prevailing view [following 
Canadian Western Bank] that the application of interjurisdictional 
immunity is generally limited to the cores of every legislative head of 
power already identified in the jurisprudence”.95 She then proceeded to 
set out a two-step test that must be satisfied for the doctrine to be 
engaged: the first step determines whether “the provincial law … 
trenches on the protected ‘core’ of a federal competence”; the “second 
step is to determine whether the provincial law’s effect on the exercise of 
the protected federal power is sufficiently serious to invoke the 
                                                                                                                       
in Division of Powers Cases in Canada” (J.S.D. Dissertation, Columbia Law School, 2014), online: 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.7916/D87D2S7R> [hereinafter “Wright, ‘Beyond’”]. 
89 See the sources listed in note 69. 
90 COPA, supra, note 34. 
91 Hogg, supra, note 33, at 15.8(c). 
92 R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2. 
93 They also argued that the provincial law was constitutionally invalid, under the pith and 
substance doctrine, or inoperative, under the doctrine of federal paramountcy. 
94 COPA, supra, note 34, at para. 4. She rejected the invalidity and operability arguments 
raised: see previous note. 
95 Id., at para. 26 (emphasis added). 
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doctrine”.96 The manner in which she framed and applied this test 
suggested a broader scope for the doctrine. 
Chief Justice McLachlin said that the first step was satisfied by 
precedent; aeronautics had clearly been held to fall within federal 
jurisdiction, and the Court had, she suggested, “repeatedly and 
consistently held that the location of aerodromes lies within the core of 
the federal aeronautics power”.97 The second step (a “sufficiently 
serious” impact) was also satisfied because the provincial law would 
“impair the exercise of the federal competence”; if the law applied, she 
said, Parliament would be forced “to choose between accepting that the 
province can forbid the placement of aerodromes on the one hand, or 
specifically legislating to override the provincial law on the other 
hand”.98 She rejected the province’s argument that there was no 
impairment because it remained open to Parliament to regulate the 
location of aerodromes, displacing any contrary provincial law under the 
doctrine of federal paramountcy. Accepting this argument would 
“narrow Parliament’s legislative options and impede the exercise of its 
core jurisdiction”.99 
The decision in COPA seemed to adopt a much less restrictive 
approach to the doctrine of interjurisdictional than Canadian Western 
Bank. The Court in Canadian Western Bank had not provided a clear 
indication of precisely what must be impaired for the doctrine to be 
engaged. However, the decision seemed to suggest that the focus of the 
impairment analysis was to be on the concrete impact of the impugned 
law on the protected aspects of actual (generally federal) undertakings, 
persons, things and activities, not the impact of the impugned law on 
legislative freedom or choice in the protected “core”.100 The decision in 
COPA, in contrast, placed the focus of the impairment analysis squarely 
on Parliament’s legislative freedom or choice in the protected “core”.101 
                                                                                                                       
96 Id., at para. 27. 
97 Id., at paras. 28-40. 
98 Id., at para. 60. 
99 Id., at para. 53 (emphasis added). 
100 See Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 477; Elliot, 2011, supra, note 72, at 430-31. Further 
evidence that the Court in Canadian Western Bank took this to be the focus of the impairment 
analysis can be found in Lafarge (supra, note 69), a companion case to Canadian Western Bank. In 
Lafarge, Bastarache J., writing separately, criticized the majority decision (also by Binnie and  
LeBel JJ.) for focusing the impairment analysis on the impugned law’s impact on the federal 
undertaking rather the federal power (para. 109). 
101 COPA, supra, note 34, at para. 46 (“The question is whether applying [the impugned law] 
would impair the exercise of the core of a federal power, in this case Parliament’s ability to decide 
when and where aerodromes should be built”); see also id., at paras. 44-48. 
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This seems an easier approach to satisfy, turning an analysis that 
appeared to require evidence of concrete adverse consequences for actual 
(typically federal) undertakings, persons, things or activities into an 
abstract, non-evidence-based assessment about legislative freedom or 
choice. In addition, as noted, the decision seemed to suggest that this 
new impairment test would be satisfied any time (typically federal) 
“legislative options” might be “narrowed” in a protected area. This 
seemed to reduce “impairment” to an analysis of whether the two orders 
of government might want to pursue a different regulatory path 
(including, perhaps, by leaving the area unregulated). And since the 
conclusion would invariably seem to be yes, this effectively seemed to 
render the impairment requirement redundant102  a result that is hard to 
square with Canadian Western Bank, which treated it as a way to limit 
the reach of the doctrine.103  
Two members of the Court (both from Quebec) dissented in COPA. 
Justice Deschamps, writing with the support of LeBel J., rejected the 
argument that the provincial law could not apply to private aerodromes 
due to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.104 In doing so, she 
invoked her dissent in Quebec v. Lacombe, a companion case that 
                                                                                                                       
102 For a similar (although not identical) suggestion, see Elliot, 2011, supra, note 72, at 433. 
Elliot suggests that the impairment requirement should be “jettisoned” entirely, a solution that, he 
argues, is consistent with the “purpose of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine”  “to protect 
the principle of exclusivity”: id., 434. This proposal would expand the reach of the doctrine, unless 
the protected “core” was contracted to offset the elimination of the impairment requirement. Elliot 
has suggested elsewhere that the test used to define the protected cores cannot be any narrower: 
Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 497. 
See also Bruce Ryder, “Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism: The Continuing Search for 
Balance in the Interpretation of the Division of Powers” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2011) 54 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 565, at 588-92 [hereinafter, “Ryder, 2011”] (highlighting the tensions between COPA 
and Canadian Western Bank). 
103 A more generous reading of COPA is possible. On this reading, the language of 
“narrowing” legislative options must be read narrowly, and in the context of the particular case; it 
should not be read as altering the approach to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity articulated 
in Canadian Western Bank, but as a response to an argument that the doctrine should not be held to 
be triggered, because it remained open to the federal government to override provincial land use 
laws under the federal paramountcy doctrine by legislating the location of particular aerodromes. 
And yet, while Canadian Western Bank is cited regularly in COPA, the majority in COPA does seem 
to rely on the potential narrowing of legislative options to justify its conclusion that the doctrine is 
triggered  a move picked up and criticized by the dissent (see the text accompanying notes 104 to 
107). It is also noteworthy that the Court refined, but did not altogether abandon, its concern for 
legislative options in its decision in Marcotte (see the text accompanying notes 114 to 115). 
104 COPA, supra, note 34, at para. 91. Justice LeBel wrote a brief decision concurring with 
Deschamps J.’s analysis on the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity: id., at para. 76. 
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involved similar (but not identical) facts and arguments.105 There, she 
openly took issue with the Chief Justice’s impairment analysis, 
criticizing her for focusing on the “effect of the impugned provincial rule 
on the federal power” rather than its “concrete effects” on the “activities 
of the federal undertaking”.106 She suggested that such an approach was 
“antithetical” to Canadian Western Bank, and effectively rendered the 
“impairment test … superfluous”.107  
(b)  Marcotte: More Conflicting Signals 
By the time the Court heard the appeal in Marcotte, it had, as noted 
earlier, released two more decisions  PHS and Ryan Estate — that are 
easier to reconcile with the restrictive role accorded the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity in Canadian Western Bank.108 However, in 
those cases, the Court did not disclaim the reasoning or result in COPA. 
And so, not surprisingly, the parties in Marcotte presented very different 
accounts of the scope of the doctrine in support of their positions, 
emphasizing different decisions in support of their respective positions.  
The banks, unsurprisingly, relied heavily on the Court’s decision in 
COPA. The trial judge had found that the impairment requirement was 
not satisfied because, among other things, complying with the CPA 
would involve a “minor inconvenience” for the banks. The banks 
dismissed “such ‘facts’” as irrelevant, arguing that “the issue is not 
whether banks could operate with provincial regulation of their core 
functions”, but whether the application of the CPA “would involve ‘a 
substantial restriction of Parliament’s legislative freedom’ or ‘narrow 
Parliament’s legislative options’ in respect of a core part of banking”.109 
They suggested that the impairment requirement was satisfied here 
because Parliament would be forced to legislate if it wanted to 
supplement, or pre-empt, the CPA and similar provincial requirements. 
                                                                                                                       
105 Lacombe, supra, note 61. Lacombe involved a municipal by-law that regulated the 
location of private aerodromes. Chief Justice McLachlin, for the same seven-judge majority, held 
that the by-law was invalid, under the pith and substance doctrine, and even if valid, inapplicable, 
under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. The same two members of the Court dissented. 
However, in Lacombe, Deschamps J. held  as she had in COPA  that there was no division of 
powers impediment to the municipal by-law, while LeBel J. held that the municipal by-law was 
rendered inoperative under the federal paramountcy doctrine. 
106 Id., at paras. 116, 160. See also COPA, supra, note 34, at para. 91. 
107 Id., at paras. 116, 158. 
108 PHS, supra, note 73, at, paras. 57-70; and Ryan Estate, supra, note 61, at paras. 50-64. 
109 Marcotte (Respondent banks’ factum), supra, note 37, at paras. 66-67. 
212 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
The banks found support for this argument in a broad, but plausible, 
reading of the Court’s decision in COPA. 
The plaintiffs, in contrast, relied heavily on the Court’s decision in 
Canadian Western Bank, and paid less attention to the Court’s decision 
in COPA. They defended the trial judge’s finding that the impairment 
requirement was not satisfied because the activities of the banks would 
not be impaired, implicitly affirming an impairment analysis that focused 
on the impact that applying the CPA requirements here would have on 
the banks, not on Parliament’s legislative freedom.110 And they also 
accused the banks of attempting to reargue the Court’s decision in 
Canadian Western Bank.111 
The Court’s decision, rejecting the argument of the banks that the 
CPA requirements were constitutionally inapplicable to the credit card 
activities of banks under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, 
seems more in keeping with the restrained approach to the doctrine 
adopted in Canadian Western Bank, as well as more recent cases like 
PHS and Ryan Estate. Justices Rothstein and Wagner emphasized that 
the doctrine will apply in only “rare circumstances”, and  citing 
Canadian Western Bank  that it “must be applied ‘with restraint’ and 
‘should in general be reserved for situations covered by precedent’”.112 
And they chided the banks for arguing “for exactly the type of 
amorphous, sweeping immunity that was rejected in Canadian Western 
Bank”, stating that “banks cannot avoid the application of all provincial 
statutes that in any way touch on their operations”.113 
In addition, their decision takes the opportunity to address the 
apparent tension between the Court’s decision in Canadian Western 
Bank and COPA. They suggest that the Court found an impairment 
sufficient to trigger the doctrine in COPA because the legislation 
imposed a “blanket ban, under certain conditions, on an activity that fell 
within the core of the federal aeronautics power”, and so applying it 
“would force Parliament to pass legislation to countermand the 
provincial rules, failing which the activity could not occur at all”.114 
They distinguished this from the CPA requirements, which, they said, 
                                                                                                                       
110 Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte, [2014] S.C.J. No. 55, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725 2014 SCC 55, 
at para. 63 (S.C.C.) (Appellant plaintiffs’ factum) [hereinafter “Marcotte (Appellant plaintiffs’ 
factum)”] (suggesting that this finding was based on “a careful review of the evidence” and “proof”). 
111 Id., at para. 65. 
112 Marcotte, supra, note 5, at paras. 63-64. 
113 Id., at para. 68. 
114 Id., at para. 69 (emphasis added). 
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“affect how banks carry out a certain aspect of their activities”, but do 
not ban them altogether.115 This is a narrow reading of COPA, which 
could, as noted, be read to suggest that simply narrowing legislative 
freedom was enough to satisfy the “impairment” requirement. But again, 
it seems more in keeping with the restrained approach to the doctrine 
adopted in Canadian Western Bank and later cases.  
And yet, conflicting signals remain. The Court’s decision continues 
to send conflicting signals about the focus of the impairment analysis. As 
noted, in Canadian Western Bank, the Court seemed to suggest that the 
focus of the impairment analysis should be the concrete impact of the 
impugned law on the protected aspects of the actual undertaking, person, 
thing, or activity involved, while in COPA, the Court focused, more 
abstractly, on the impact of the impugned law on legislative freedom in 
relation to the protected core of jurisdiction  a focus that was criticized 
by the two dissenting members of the Court.116 In Marcotte, Rothstein 
and Wagner JJ. seemed to adopt an analysis that focuses on both. For 
example, they suggest in one sentence that the CPA provisions “do not in 
any way impair any activities that are ‘vital or essential to banking’ such 
that Parliament might be forced to specifically legislate to override the 
provincial law”;117 this seems to place the focus squarely on Parliament’s 
legislative freedom. Then, in the very next sentence, they suggest that 
“[r]equiring banks to inform customers of how their relationship will be 
governed or be subject to certain remedies does not limit banks’ abilities 
to dictate the terms of that relationship or otherwise limit their 
activities”;118 this seems to place the focus squarely on the activities of 
the banks, not Parliament’s legislative freedom. It is thus unclear whether 
either can now be used to establish an impairment, or if both must now 
be established. 
In addition, the decision does not provide clear guidance about how 
much legislative freedom must be restricted to (help) establish 
impairment. The discussion of COPA seems to suggest that an impugned 
                                                                                                                       
115 Id. See also id., at para. 68 (“the provisions of the CPA do not prevent banks from 
lending money or converting currency, but only require that conversion fees be disclosed to 
consumers”) (emphasis added). 
116 See the text accompanying notes 104 to 107, above. 
117 Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 66. See also id., at para. 69 (“The disclosure and remedy 
provisions do affect how banks carry out a certain aspect of their activities, but as discussed above 
that effect does not amount to impairment”) (emphasis added). 
118 Id. See also id., at para. 69 (“It is hard to imagine how these provisions would force 
Parliament to pass legislation to countermand them, failing which it would be impaired in its ability 
to achieve the purpose for which exclusive jurisdiction over banking was conferred”). 
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law that imposes a “blanket ban” on an activity that falls within a 
protected core of jurisdiction conferred on the other order of government 
will be sufficient. It also seems to suggest that a mere narrowing of 
legislative freedom will be insufficient. But the decision fails to provide 
clear guidance about whether something between a “blanket ban” and a 
mere narrowing is sufficient.119 
This might seem like mere doctrinal quibbling. And yet, the issues I 
have highlighted have implications, as noted, for the scope and 
application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. More 
fundamentally, they also engage broader debates about the proper 
balance of power, the nature of the federal system, and the role of the 
courts in safeguarding it.120 
(c) Moving Forward 
What should become of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity? 
The doctrine has been a source of controversy for decades, both inside 
and outside of the courts. Some have argued that the doctrine has an 
important role to play in a division of powers analysis, and have limited 
themselves, at most, to offering recommendations for how it might best 
be reformed.121 Others have argued that the doctrine should be 
abandoned  or, failing that, at least significantly curtailed.122 The key 
                                                                                                                       
119 The idea that a “blanket ban” is sufficient is also not entirely clear. Legislation often uses 
conditional “bans” to achieve different regulatory goals. It is unclear from Marcotte whether the 
impairment requirement will be satisfied in all such cases; if so, the Court’s narrow reading of 
COPA might not be so narrow after all. The Court in Marcotte noted that the provincial law imposed 
a “blanket ban, under certain conditions”, suggesting that at least some conditional bans will satisfy 
the impairment requirement: id., at para. 69. 
120 For an exploration of these links, see Wright, supra, note 69, at 327-35. 
121 One of the staunchest defences of the doctrine inside the courts can be found in Beetz J.’s 
decision, for the Court, in Bell Canada v. Québec (Commission de santé et de la sécurité du travail 
du Québec), [1988] S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bell”]. 
The doctrine has been defended outside the courts by, e.g., Robin Elliot ((Comment) (1988) 67 
Can. Bar Rev. 523; Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69; Elliot, 2011, supra, note 72; Joseph Magnet, “Research 
Note: The Difference Between Paramountcy and Interjurisdictional Immunity”, in Constitutional Law 
of Canada: Cases, Notes and Materials, 8th ed. (2001), vol. 1, 341; and, more recently, but in a limited 
way, Hogg, supra, note 33, at 15.8(c), fn. 141, noting his earlier criticism of the doctrine, but suggesting 
that he has been “persuaded by Beetz J. and Professor Elliot that some degree of interjurisdictional 
immunity is entailed by the Constitution of Canada’s dual list of exclusive powers”. 
122 One of the staunchest criticisms of the doctrine inside the courts can be found in the 
decision of Dickson C.J.C. (Lamer J. concurring) in Ontario Public Service Employees’ Union v. 
Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 16-22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“OPSEU”]. 
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arguments that have been offered in support of these views were outlined 
in Canadian Western Bank.123 
The defenders of the doctrine have offered two main arguments in 
support of it. First, they have argued that the doctrine is grounded in the 
references to exclusivity in the text of sections 91 and 92 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867.124 The argument is that the doctrine safeguards 
the Constitution’s grants of exclusive jurisdiction, by ensuring that the 
heads of power operate defensively to some extent, not only granting 
power to one order of government, but also denying it to the other order 
of government.125 
Second, the defenders of the doctrine have also argued that it 
provides an essential doctrinal tool to address unconstitutional 
applications of otherwise valid laws. In doing so, it is argued, it ensures 
that an order of government that lacks the jurisdiction to regulate a 
matter directly in a narrowly-framed law (because the law would be 
invalid as a law in pith and substance in relation to an extrajurisdictional 
matter) does not have the jurisdiction to regulate the same matter 
indirectly in a broadly-framed law of “general application” (because the 
law as drafted is not invalid, by virtue of its valid applications, but can 
nonetheless still be applied to the extrajurisdictional matter).126 In 
addition, it is argued, it protects against the risk that “provincial 
regulators will not have thought about the impact of their laws on federal 
undertakings”, and might “lack the expertise that the federal regulators 
possess by virtue of being the primary regulator”.127 
                                                                                                                       
The doctrine has been criticized outside of the courts by, e.g., Dale Gibson, 
(“Interjurisdictional Immunity in Canadian Federalism” (1969) 47 Can. Bar Rev. 40; and Comment 
(1990) 69 Can. Bar Rev. 339); Weiler (supra, note 70, at 340-42); Bruce Ryder (“The Demise and 
Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism: Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces  
and First Nations” (1990-1991) 36 McGill L.J. 308, 334-39, 352-54 [hereinafter “Ryder, 1990”]; and 
Ryder, 2011, supra, note 102, at 579-94); and Peter Hogg, in a previous edition of Constitutional Law 
of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), at 329-32 [hereinafter “Hogg, 1985”]; as noted in note 121, 
above, Professor Hogg has since softened his criticism of the doctrine. 
123 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at paras. 33-47; see also Lafarge, supra, note 69, 
at paras. 99-111. 
124 See, e.g., Bell, supra, note 121, at 839-40; and Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 483-84. 
125 Hogg, supra, note 33, at 15.8(e). 
126 Id., 15.8(c), fn. 141 (embracing “some degree of interjurisdictional immunity” because 
“[o]therwise, what would be incompetent to a legislative body in a narrowly framed law would be 
permitted if the law were framed more broadly”); and Lafarge, supra, note 69, at para. 103, per 
Bastarache J. (suggesting the doctrine is necessary to prevent the “impermissible application of an 
otherwise valid provincial law to a federal matter”). 
127 Hogg & Godil, supra, note 69, at 636. The assumption underlying this argument is that 
the doctrine operates to protect federal powers/undertakings from provincial laws. 
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The critics of the doctrine have offered several arguments against it. 
First, they have argued that the doctrine is a source of considerable legal 
uncertainty, and raises concerns about judicial competence.128 This is 
because the doctrine requires the courts to define the “protected core” of 
(typically) federal powers, a protected core that is “of indeterminate 
scope” and thus “difficult to define”.129 It is also because the approach of 
the courts to the doctrine has been unstable and unpredictable, making it 
difficult for courts, governments and litigants to anticipate how it will be 
applied.130  
Second, the critics have also argued that the doctrine is undesirable, 
because it runs counter to the “dominant tide” of Canadian federalism, 
legally and in practice  a “federalism that puts greater emphasis on the 
legitimate interplay between federal and provincial powers”, and 
“favour[s], where possible, the ordinary operation of statutes enacted by 
both levels of government”.131 The doctrine runs counter to this 
“dominant tide” because it protects an exclusive “core” of power from 
the “statutes enacted by [one] level of government” regardless of whether 
or how it has been exercised.132 
Third, the critics have also argued that the doctrine has been applied 
“asymmetrically”, and thus is “perverse”.133 This is because, even though 
the courts have said the doctrine is reciprocal, it has, in practice, 
primarily  some have suggested (almost) exclusively  been applied 
to favour federal power and federal undertakings at the expense of 
provincial laws.134 
                                                                                                                       
128 See, e.g., Weiler, supra, note 70, at 340-42; and Furey, supra, note 69, at 603-607. 
129 See, e.g., Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at paras. 42-43. 
130 For a response to this criticism, see Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 484-85. 
131 See Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, paras. 36-37 (citing OPSEU, supra, note 122, 
at 17-18, per Dickson C.J.C.). See also Hogg 1985, supra, note 122, at 330-31. 
132 For an attempt to answer this criticism, see Bell, supra, note 121, at 839-840 per Beetz J.; 
and Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 482-484. 
133 Hogg, 1985, supra, note 122, at 331-32; see also Ryder, 2011, supra, note 102, at 581-94. 
On the idea of provincial (or “reciprocal”) interjurisdictional immunity, see Dwight Newman, 
“Canada’s Re-Emerging Division of Powers and the Unrealized Force of Reciprocal 
Interjurisdictional Immunity” (2011) 20 Const. Forum 1; and Michelle Biddulph, “Shifting the Tide 
of Canadian Federalism: The Operation of Provincial Interjurisdictional Immunity in the Post-
Canadian Western Bank Era” (2014) 77 Sask. L. Rev. 45. 
134 For acknowledgment from the Court that the doctrine is reciprocal in theory, but 
asymmetrical in practice, see, e.g., Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at paras. 34-35, 43; see 
also PHS, supra, note 73, at para. 65. For disagreements about the extent to which the doctrine has 
been applied asymmetrically by the courts, compare Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 468-69 (arguing 
there are “a number of cases in which federal legislation has been read down in order to protect from 
enroachment an area assigned exclusively to the provincial legislatures”); and Hogg, supra, note 33, 
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Finally, the critics have also argued the doctrine is unnecessary. This 
is because the “exclusivity of federal jurisdiction is adequately 
protected” by the pith and substance doctrine, which precludes one order 
of government from validly enacting laws that in pith and substance 
relate to a matter that is allocated to the other.135 It is also because “the 
rule of federal paramountcy already limits the ability of provincial 
legislatures to intrude into federal jurisdiction, as long as there is federal 
regulation in place that creates a conflict with the provincial law”  or, 
failing that, “Parliament chooses to legislate to create a conflict with the 
provincial law”.136  
I am inclined to agree with the critics of the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity. The Court’s recent decisions  including 
Marcotte  do little to quell the criticism that the scope and application 
of the doctrine has had a shifting and unpredictable character. And there 
is, I think, a good deal of merit in the arguments that the doctrine is 
largely undesirable, perverse and unnecessary. The best argument for the 
doctrine, in my view, is that it provides a tool to deal with the 
unconstitutional application of otherwise valid laws, precluding 
governments from accomplishing indirectly what they cannot accomplish 
directly. However, it is not obvious to me that a separate doctrine is 
needed to address this issue; on the contrary, I am inclined to think that it 
may be possible to utilize the pith and substance doctrine and ancillary 
doctrine137 to address it, assimilating the analysis of validity and the 
analysis of applicability.138 
                                                                                                                       
at 15.8(f) (agreeing with Elliot); with Ryder, 2011, supra, note 102, at 581-82 (challenging Elliot’s 
reading of the cases). For two recent cases in which the Court rejected interjurisdictional immunity 
arguments aimed at protecting a core of provincial power, see PHS, supra, note 73; and Carter, 
supra, note 73. 
135 Ryder, 1990, supra, note 122, at 352-54. 
136 See Hogg & Godil, supra, note 69, at 635-36 (but see id., 637, qualifying this argument). 
See also Hogg, 1985, supra, note 122, at 331-32; OPSEU, supra, note 122, at 18, per Dickson 
C.J.C.; and Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at para. 46. 
For an attempt to answer this criticism, see Bell, supra, note 121, at 843 per Beetz J. 
(dismissing this “policy” argument); and Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 489-90. 
137 The ancillary powers doctrine is now used to assess the validity of part of a legislative 
scheme: see Wright, supra, note 69, at 640-41. 
138 There are a few cases where a federal law seems to have been “read down” in the context 
of an invalidity analysis to avoid unconstitutional applications of the law: see, e.g., Clark v. 
Canadian National Railway Co., [1988] S.C.J. No. 90, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 680 (S.C.C.); and Isen v. 
Simms, [2006] S.C.J. No. 41, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 349 (S.C.C.). 
Robin Elliot, a strong advocate of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, has noted that the 
“essential claim being made [under the ancillary doctrine and the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity] is the same  that one order of government is attempting to extend the reach of 
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And yet, the courts in Canada seem committed to the use of the 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity to address issues of applicability. 
Accordingly, rather than simply call, yet again, for the doctrine to be 
abandoned, it seems more worthwhile to consider other ways to reform 
the doctrine, taking into account the various arguments offered in favour 
of and against it. There have been various proposals for the reform of the 
doctrine over the years, both inside and outside the courts, but the focus 
of such proposals has tended to be on attempting to clarify the test or 
standard used to trigger the doctrine, as it has been traditionally 
understood. My inclination is to take a different approach, which shifts 
the manner in which the doctrine has traditionally been understood, by 
treating it as a federalism-based clear statement rule, rather than an 
absolute limit on jurisdiction. 
What are federalism-based clear statement rules? The term may be 
unfamiliar.139 Federalism-based clear statement rules are a form of soft 
jurisdictional limit that requires an order of government to speak clearly 
when it pursues an initiative with certain division of powers implications. 
They are a soft jurisdictional limit because they do not preclude an order 
of government from pursuing an initiative altogether. Rather, where they 
apply, they require the use of clear statutory language. Where an 
initiative is held by a court to lack sufficiently clear statutory language, it 
                                                                                                                       
legislation that looks to be within its power to enact into an area of exclusive legislative jurisdiction 
assigned by our Constitution to the other order, either by including in that legislation a provision that 
arguably over-reaches (ancillary powers) or by applying that legislation in a manner that arguably 
over-reaches (interjurisdictional immunity)”: Elliot, 2011, supra, note 72, at 437. He has argued that 
the analysis under the two doctrines should be assimilated, partly by making the ancillary doctrine 
analysis look more like a doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity analysis, in particular by 
incorporating the notion of core areas of jurisdiction into the ancillary analysis: id., at 438-39. 
My inclination is to move the courts away from this sort of interjurisdictional immunity 
analysis, and so I am skeptical of this proposal. I favour exploring ways to synthesize an 
interjurisdictional immunity analysis into a (perhaps slightly reformulated) ancillary analysis. I leave 
the contours of how this might occur to future work. The courts in the United States distinguish 
between challenges to the validity of a law itself (“facial challenges”) and the validity of particular 
applications of a law (“as-applied challenges”): see Gillian E. Metzger, “Facial Challenges and 
Federalism” (2005) 105 Colum. L. Rev. 873. 
139 There is a large body of scholarship in the United States exploring clear statement rules, 
in the federalism context and more generally. On federalism-based clear statement rules, see,  
e.g., Ernest A. Young, “Two Cheers for Process Federalism” (2001) 46 Vill. Law Rev. 1349; and 
Gillian Metzger, “Administrative Law as the New Federalism” (2008) 57 Duke L.J. 2023, 2091-2101. 
More generally, see, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, “A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental 
Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue” (2001) 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1575. For 
criticism, see, e.g., John F. Manning, “Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution” (2010) 110 
Colum. L. Rev. 399; and Dan T. Coenen, “The Pros and Cons of Politically Reversible 
‘Semisubstantive’ Constitutional Rules” (2009) 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2835 (identifying the key 
criticisms and providing responses to them). 
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remains open to the relevant order of government to pursue the initiative, 
provided that any legislative response includes sufficiently clear statutory 
language. 
How would an approach that treats the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity as a federalism-based clear statement rule work? Such an 
approach could proceed in two stages. At the first stage, the courts would 
apply the standard two-step analysis that is already now used to 
determine whether the doctrine is triggered.140 The change would be the 
introduction of a second stage to the analysis, which would be considered 
only where the doctrine is triggered at the first stage of the analysis.141 At 
this second stage, the courts would consider whether the impugned law 
includes clear statutory language applying it to the extrajurisdictional 
matter. If it did not include clear statutory language, the impugned law 
would be read down so as not to apply. But, if it did include clear 
statutory language, the impugned law would not be read down; rather, it 
would be held to apply.142 
This new approach to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity 
would open up the possibility for a legislative response overriding a 
judicial decision invoking the doctrine to read down an impugned law. 
Take the standard case where the doctrine is applied to preclude a 
provincial law from applying to a federal undertaking. The relevant 
                                                                                                                       
140 See the text accompanying note 34. 
141 The ordering of the two stages warrants additional thought. There is an argument for 
shifting the order of the two stages of the analysis, considering clear statement first; this might limit 
the situations in which the courts need to make the sorts of decisions called for by a conventional 
interjurisdictional immunity analysis. I have put the clear statement analysis second, because I think 
it might be difficult to conduct such an analysis without a clear sense of the extrajurisdictional matter 
that is being protected, and in relation to which a clear statement is required. The first stage would 
help bring this into better focus. 
142 The doctrine is usually applied to provincial laws of general application  broadly-
framed provincial laws that do not include language explicitly applying them to a potentially 
extrajurisdictional matter. The extent to which the doctrine applies outside this context is unclear, 
although the doctrine has been discussed in cases involving broadly-framed laws that include 
language explicitly applying them to an allegedly extrajurisdictional matter: see, e.g., Elliot, 2008, 
supra, note 69, at 469, fn. 157 (discussing Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, and arguing the 
doctrine should not have been applied because the impugned provincial law included language 
explicitly applying it to banks, the allegedly extrajurisdictional matter). The approach I have outlined 
assumes that the doctrine does not apply only to laws of general application; otherwise, the inclusion 
of explicit statutory language applying the law to an extrajurisdictional matter would render the 
doctrine (and the approach I describe) irrelevant from the outset. (The inclusion of explicit language 
would be relevant to a clear statement analysis.) The approach I have outlined also does not assume 
that a validity and applicability analysis will lead to the same result; otherwise, in those cases where 
a statute includes language explicitly applying it to an allegedly extrajurisdictional matter, making it 
subject to a validity challenge, an applicability (interjurisdictional immunity) challenge would 
simply be redundant. 
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provincial legislature could revisit the decision under this new 
reformulated version of the doctrine. If it decided not to amend the law to 
incorporate clear statutory language applying it to the federal 
undertaking, the law would continue not to apply. But, if it did decide to 
amend the law to include clear statutory language applying it to the 
federal undertaking, the law would then apply (unless a future court 
found that the language used was not sufficiently clear). The result would 
be to make the decision about the application of the law a joint project of 
the courts and political branches, not the courts alone. 
What would be the benefits of an approach that treats the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity as a federalism-based clear statement rule?143 
First, this approach would address (or mitigate) the criticisms about legal 
uncertainty and judicial competence that have been directed against the 
doctrine, in effect by lowering the stakes of judicial decision-making and 
dispersing responsibility, decreasing the risk and impact of judicial error. 
This is because court decisions applying the doctrine would not be final; 
rather, they would be provisional, subject to legislative override, in the 
form of a law including clear language applying it to the extrajurisdictional 
matter. To be sure, there is no general agreement about whether, and how 
much, the doctrine is open to criticisms about legal uncertainty and judicial 
competence.144 And yet, where these criticisms have been accepted as 
legitimate, the response, among those not calling for the doctrine to be 
abandoned, has generally been to criticize the courts’ decision-making, or 
to offer refinements to the test used to trigger it.145 A clear statement 
approach would acknowledge that the problem might be at least in part the 
task itself. It would lower the stakes of the tough choices that the doctrine 
requires the courts to make, and decrease the risk and impact of judicial 
error, in effect by opening up the judicial decisions that apply it to 
legislative reversal. 
                                                                                                                       
143 I draw here on the discussion in Wright, “Beyond”, supra, note 88, at 436-440. 
144 Compare, e.g., Weiler, supra, note 70, at 340-42 (highlighting the “unstable and 
unpredictable character” of the Court’s decisions as one of several reasons to eschew judicial review 
of the division of powers); with Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 484 (disputing the claim that the 
doctrine causes the courts “any real difficulty”, and calling a concern about legal uncertainty an 
“exceedingly weak reason not to apply a constitutional doctrine in novel contexts”). I agree that 
claims doctrines should be abandoned because they are unstable and unpredictable and should be 
approached with caution; we see such claims in all areas of constitutional law, and if this were a 
sufficient basis for abandoning a doctrine, we might have to do away with much of constitutional 
law altogether. However, it is, I think, one concern among many that properly is and should be taken 
into account. 
145 See, e.g., Lafarge, supra, note 69, at para. 108, per Bastarache J. (agreeing with “some 
critics” that the application of the doctrine “is often difficult”, and offering refinements). 
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Second, and relatedly, a clear statement approach to the doctrine 
would facilitate deliberation, between the courts and political branches, 
and the political branches themselves, about the division of powers. It 
would do so by providing notice to the two orders of government that an 
impugned law raises the division of powers concerns implicated by the 
doctrine, and presenting the chance for debate and compromise, within 
and between them, about whether the law should still be applied. It 
would thus address the concern, identified earlier, that an order of 
government that drafts a broadly-worded law may not have thought 
about the impact of applying the law to an extrajurisdictional matter.146  
It would also be consistent with the facilitative approach evident in the 
Court’s recent federalism decisions, an approach that casts the courts as 
facilitators of “cooperative federalism”, and limits their conventional role 
in imposing substantive outcomes.147 
Third, and relatedly, a clear statement approach to the doctrine would 
be more in keeping with the “dominant tide” of Canadian federalism than 
the current approach. By opening up judicial decisions applying the 
doctrine to legislative reversal, this approach would be more in line with a 
“federalism that puts greater emphasis on the legitimate interplay between 
federal and provincial powers”, and that “favour[s], where possible, the 
ordinary operation of statutes enacted by both levels of government”.148 
Fourth, a clear statement approach to the doctrine would “minimize 
concerns about democratic accountability, by permitting and to some 
extent encouraging federalism-related decision-making to occur in forums 
(like elected legislatures) that are accountable to the federal and provincial 
electorates — and … leaving the final word to the political branches”.149 
Finally, a clear statement approach to the doctrine would mitigate the 
criticism that the doctrine has been applied asymmetrically, and thus is 
perverse. It would give the provinces the power to override decisions 
applying the doctrine to limit the application of otherwise valid 
provincial laws, indirectly safeguarding provincial autonomy, and 
allowing them to counter the “unintentional centralizing tendency” of the 
current approach.150  
                                                                                                                       
146 See the text accompanying note 127. 
147 I have discussed this approach in detail elsewhere: see notes 69, 88. 
148 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at paras. 36-37 (emphasis added). 
149 Wright, supra, note 88, at 435. For a discussion of the democratic accountability 
concerns raised by judicial review of the division of powers, see id., at 335-42. 
150 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at para. 45. 
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A major criticism that is likely to be directed at a clear statement 
approach to the doctrine is that it would fail to protect an exclusive core of 
jurisdiction, undermining the very purpose of the doctrine.151 After all, the 
doctrine would not be engaged where the impugned law contained 
sufficiently clear statutory language applying it to the extrajurisdictional 
matter. And yet, it is unclear how much the doctrine actually now operates 
to protect an “exclusive” core of jurisdiction, since it is engaged only 
where the impact is “sufficiently serious” to reach the level of 
“impairment”, not where an impugned law has any impact at all on a 
matter falling within this exclusive core. In addition, the ability of the 
legislative branches to override a judicial decision holding the doctrine to 
be engaged does not necessarily mean that whatever “exclusive” core of 
jurisdiction the doctrine does actually protect will be lost. It simply means 
that the protection of this exclusive core of jurisdiction would fall, 
ultimately, to the political safeguards of Canadian federalism. As I have 
argued elsewhere, the federal and provincial governments have a greater 
ability to protect their own jurisdiction than many seem to imagine  an 
ability that they can, and do, use to limit, or block, perceived jurisdictional 
encroachments.152 The federal government (the chief benefactor of the 
doctrine) could summon these political safeguards to protect whatever 
“exclusive” core of jurisdiction the doctrine now protects  including by 
threatening to invoke (and actually invoking, if necessary) its power to 
displace conflicting provincial laws under the doctrine of federal 
paramountcy. Finally, a clear statement approach would not abandon the 
political branches to their own devices altogether. The doctrine would still 
be engaged in the absence of clear statutory language, shifting the status 
quo against the application of the impugned law. And, while a judicial 
decision invoking the doctrine could be overridden legislatively, the 
                                                                                                                       
151 The textual argument for the doctrine (see note 124) is mixed. It is true the Constitution 
Act, 1867 refers several times, in ss. 91 and 92, to “exclusive” legislative power, but, of course, it 
also includes federal declaratory and disallowance powers, which are hard to square with 
“exclusive” provincial legislative power. These might be dismissed as historical artifacts, since 
neither has been invoked in decades, but this then begs the question  why not the references to 
exclusivity as well? It might be argued that it is not possible to have a federal system without some 
degree of jurisdictional exclusivity, at least provincially, but this is not a textual argument  and the 
argument itself is open to debate. 
In addition, even if one accepts that the text requires exclusive federal and provincial 
legislative power, it is by no means obvious that it requires the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity. It might be argued, for example, that the pith and substance doctrine provides all the 
protection that is needed to safeguard exclusive legislative power, and thus that the text’s call for 
exclusive legislative power would be answered without it. 
152 See Wright, supra, note 88, at 177-270. 
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decision would increase the “legislative enactment costs” required to 
achieve this result, and also provide notice of, and the chance to oppose, its 
application to an extrajurisdictional matter, triggering the political 
safeguards of federalism mentioned.153 The result might be to impose real 
obstacles for the political branches to overcome. 
Another criticism that might be directed at a clear statement approach to 
the doctrine is that it would not address the concerns raised about legal 
uncertainty and judicial competence  and might even exacerbate them. 
After all, the status of the doctrine would change, with implications for 
existing situations covered by precedent, and the courts would also have to 
decide how, and how clearly, the relevant legislature would have to speak to 
override its application. It is true that the change might introduce a new 
element of legal uncertainty, at least for a time. But this is true of any change 
in judicial approach  and, as noted, the impact of this would be offset, 
since the decisions of the courts applying the doctrine could be legislatively 
overridden. In addition, the change may actually promote legal certainty in 
the long run, encouraging a practice of legislative drafting that better 
addresses the application of laws to extrajudicial matters. 
Another criticism that might be directed at a clear statement approach 
to the doctrine is that it would be counterproductive, because the  
inclusion of sufficiently clear statutory language applying a law to an 
extrajurisdictional matter would, perversely, render the law invalid under 
the pith and substance doctrine (where the validity of the entire law was at 
issue) or ancillary doctrine (where the validity of only part of the law was 
at issue).154 Again, such an objection would, I think, be unfounded. The 
inclusion of statutory language applying a law to an extrajurisdictional 
matter will not invariably lead to a finding of invalidity.155 Indeed, there 
                                                                                                                       
153 For example, where an initiative was found to speak with insufficient clarity, 
governments would need to revisit the initiative, and figure out how to respond with sufficient clarity 
to secure judicial approval; this would require time and effort, both of which have enactment costs, 
since other initiatives might be delayed, even sacrificed. In addition, responding would provide an 
opportunity for opponents to try to delay, even obstruct, the initiative, perhaps increasing the 
political capital required to pursue it. See further Matthew C. Stephenson, “The Price of Public 
Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs” 
(2008) 118 Yale L.J. 2, 41-42. 
154 As noted supra, in note 142, an assumption underlying a clear statement approach to 
the doctrine is that the doctrine does not apply only to provincial laws of  general application, 
and that a validity and applicability analysis will not invariably lead to the same result.  
155 See, e.g., Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at paras. 80-82 (rejecting a 
challenge to the validity of Alberta’s Insurance Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. I-3, which included a 
provision explicitly applying it to banks; upheld as valid provincial law under the pith and 
substance doctrine). 
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are a number of cases that have sustained provincial laws that single out 
federal matters for special treatment.156 And yet, while I think this 
objection is unfounded, it does, I think, highlight the need for further 
reflection about the function of the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity, and its relationship to the pith and substance doctrine and the 
ancillary doctrine. 
Finally, another criticism that might be directed at a clear statement 
approach to the doctrine is that it would be inconsistent with our 
constitutional arrangements, because it would introduce a legislative 
override into the division of powers, without the clear textual authority 
found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms157 context in the 
section 33 notwithstanding clause. Here again, such an objection would, 
I think, be unfounded. It is important to note that I am not advancing an 
argument that would subject all judicially-patrolled division of powers 
constraints to override; those constraints that flow from an application of 
the pith and substance doctrine would be untouched. In addition, this 
objection to the potential for override contemplated by a clear statement 
approach to the doctrine loses much, if not all, of its force if the courts 
and the political branches are understood to play a shared role in 
interpreting and enforcing the Constitution, including the division of 
powers. It is beyond the scope of this article to defend this shared role. 
For now, I will stop at saying that I view it as entirely in keeping with 
our constitutional arrangements, both legally and in practice  more so 
than an approach, implicit in this objection, that casts constitutional 
interpretation and enforcement by the political branches as exceptional, 
and thus in need of clear textual support. A clear statement approach to 
the doctrine is consistent with such a shared approach to the division of 
powers. 
To be sure, a clear statement approach to the doctrine is unlikely to 
satisfy those who think it should be abandoned altogether, as well as 
those who think it plays a vital role in protecting judicially-enforced 
exclusive jurisdictional enclaves. However, it is, I think, worth exploring 
whether there is an alternative approach to the doctrine that speaks to the 
reasons for it, but addresses (or at least mitigates) the valid arguments 
against it. A clear statement approach to the doctrine presents just such 
an alternative. 
                                                                                                                       
156 Hogg, supra, note 33, at 15.5(b) (“[t]he singling out of undertakings within federal 
jurisdiction is not conclusive of pith and substance”, listing various cases in support). 
157 Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
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2. Federal Paramountcy and Clear Statement 
A federalism-based clear statement rule could also play a valuable 
role in the context of the federal paramountcy doctrine, which is applied 
to deal with overlapping, but conflicting, federal-provincial laws. The 
Court’s decision in Marcotte illustrates how and why it might also have a 
role here. 
In Marcotte, as noted earlier, Rothstein and Wagner JJ. rejected the 
banks’ argument that the CPA requirements should be held to be 
inoperative under the doctrine because they would frustrate Parliament’s 
purpose to subject “bank-issued credit cards ... to one and only one set of 
consumer protection rules”.158 Their conclusion that there was no 
frustration of federal purpose sufficient to trigger the doctrine is sound, 
but the reasoning provided for this conclusion is not entirely convincing. 
Take first the argument that it was “dubious” that the new preamble 
to the Bank Act could be used as an interpretative aid, because it was 
added to the Act only in 2012. The preamble, recall, provides that “it is 
desirable and is in the national interest to provide for clear, 
comprehensive, exclusive, national standards applicable to banking 
products and banking services offered by banks”.159 Justices Rothstein 
and Wagner devoted only one sentence to this argument. In doing so, 
they referred only to the Court’s earlier decision in Dynar, a case that 
cautions against the use of post-enactment legislative history and 
amendments to cast light upon the enacting legislature’s purpose.160 Yet, 
the Court has also accepted that Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures can add “declaratory provisions” to legislation that offer 
binding interpretations of the legislation, “with the effect that the 
legislation in question is deemed to have always included this 
provision”.161 Justices Rothstein and Wagner failed to address whether a 
preamble generally  and this preamble specifically  might constitute 
a declaratory provision in this sense, declaring a federal purpose to 
provide for exclusive federal standards.162 There was significant 
disagreement in the case about the jurisdictional status quo prior to the 
                                                                                                                       
158 Marcotte (Appellant banks’ factum), supra, note 35, at para. 6. 
159 Preamble, supra, note 7 (emphasis added). 
160 Dynar, supra, note 52, at paras. 45-46 (cited in Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 78). 
161 See, e.g., Régie des rentes du Québec v. Canada Bread Company Ltd., [2013] S.C.J.  
No. 46, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 125, at paras. 26-35 (S.C.C.) (citing Western Minerals Ltd. v. Gaumont, 
[1953] S.C.J. No. 15, [1953] 1 S.C.R. 345 (S.C.C.)). 
162 The argument was before the Court: see, e.g., Marcotte (Respondent plaintiffs’ factum), 
supra, note 65, at paras. 86-97 (arguing that the preamble was not declaratory in this sense). 
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addition of the preamble to the Act; the banks claimed that the preamble 
merely confirmed Parliament’s original, and unbroken, intention to 
create exclusive national standards for the banks, while the plaintiffs 
claimed that there was no such original intention. But, if the conclusion 
was that the preamble did constitute a declaratory provision in this sense, 
it is difficult to see why the status quo pre-enactment would make a 
difference. Moreover, even if the conclusion was that the preamble did 
not constitute a declaratory provision in this sense, Rothstein and 
Wagner JJ. simply failed to address whether various other materials 
referred to by the parties were sufficient to establish a federal purpose to 
provide for exclusive federal standards.163 
Take next Rothstein and Wagner JJ.’s argument that the operation of 
the CPA requirements would not frustrate a federal purpose to establish 
exclusive national standards, because they “do not provide for ‘standards 
applicable to banking products and banking services offered by banks’, 
but rather articulate a contractual norm in Quebec”.164 As Peter Hogg has 
noted, “this was an implausible characterization of the complex 
disclosure provisions of the CPA”.165 The argument is, in essence, that 
the preamble is under-inclusive  that its language does not sweep 
broadly enough to capture the consumer protection requirements of  
the CPA. But, even a cursory review of the legislative history of the 
preamble reveals that the “federal purpose” was to preclude at least the 
operation of the consumer protection requirements imposed by the CPA 
and similar provincial laws. As noted, the preamble was lobbied for by 
the banks, after  and, it seems, at least partly in response to  the trial 
judge’s decision in Marcotte, rejecting the banks’ argument that the 
operation of the CPA requirements would frustrate a federal purpose to 
provide for exclusive national standards.166 The fact that the preamble’s 
purpose  or its effect  was to preclude at least the application of 
provincial consumer protection laws like the CPA was acknowledged 
several times during parliamentary debate.167 
                                                                                                                       
163 See note 51. 
164 Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 79. 
165 Hogg, supra, note 33, at 16.5(a) (2014 Update). 
166 See notes 7 and 9, above. 
167 This was highlighted several times during debate in the House of Commons: see House of 
Commons Debates (May 2, 2012), 1510 (L. Plamondon) (suggesting “the Conservatives are … 
trying to exempt their friends, the banks, from consumer protection legislation”); House of Commons 
Debates (May 4, 2012), 1125 (G. Caron) (similar comment), 1200, 1250 (J.-F. Fortin) (similar 
comment); House of Commons Debates (May 8, 2012), 1135-1140 (A. Bellavance) (similar 
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There was a different  and, in my view, better  argument that 
could have been invoked against the banks’ assertion that the operation 
of the CPA requirements would frustrate a federal purpose to provide for 
exclusive national standards. This argument keys in on the over-
inclusiveness, rather than the supposed under-inclusiveness, of the 
preamble. The argument is that there was no frustration of federal 
purpose sufficient to engage the doctrine of federal paramountcy because 
the federal Act did not include sufficiently clear language, either in the 
preamble or elsewhere in the Act, to show that Parliament intended to 
override the particular sorts of provincial “standards” imposed by the 
CPA (and similar provincial legislation).168 On the contrary, the 
preamble speaks in vague, general terms about “exclusive national 
standards applicable to banking products and banking services offered by 
banks”, language that would seem capable of capturing all provincial 
“standards” that operate in any way in relation to “banking products and 
banking services offered by banks”.169  
This argument invokes a clear statement rule, effectively making 
clear statutory language that shows that Parliament intended to pre-empt 
                                                                                                                       
comment); House of Commons Debates (June 11, 2012), 1355 (J.-F. Fortin) (similar comment), 1930 
(G. Caron) (similar comment). 
It was also acknowledged during Senate proceedings: see, e.g., Senate, Proceedings of the 
Standing Committee on National Finance (June 19, 2012) (C. Hervieux-Payette). 
Jean-Marc Fournier, then Quebec’s Minister of Justice, also directed a letter to the federal 
Minister of Finance  referred to in the Senate proceedings — expressing concerns that the 
preamble would exempt banks from the CPA requirements: see id. 
The fact that this was the purpose or effect of the preamble was never openly acknowledged by 
a member of the federal government, but the federal Minister of Finance, the sponsor of the budget 
implementation bill containing the preamble, did state that its purpose was to confirm that “all 
banking activities throughout Canada are governed exclusively … by federal standards”, and to 
“avoid the creation of local and potentially inconsistent rules that threaten the uniform application of 
the federal banking regulatory framework” (see Government of Canada, Jobs, Growth and Long-
Term Prosperity: Economic Action Plan 2012 (March 29, 2012), at 130); and a representative from 
the federal Department of Finance did acknowledge openly that the purpose of the change was to 
ensure that “bank customers should only receive disclosure as required under the Bank Act” (see 
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Finance (May 28, 2012), at 10-11 (testimony of  
J. Pearse, Director, Financial Sector Policy Branch, Department of Finance). 
168 It is a nice question whether courts should be suspicious of the use of preambles to 
preclude the operation of provincial laws. Certainly, the courts often treat preambles cautiously in 
the ordinary statutory interpretation context: see, for discussion, Kent Roach, “The Uses and 
Audiences of Preambles in Legislation” (2001) 47 McGill L.J. 129. 
169 For example, the preamble would seem capable of capturing fundamental provincial laws 
or “standards” like the laws of contract. The response of the banks was to argue that they were not 
arguing that banks are immune from contract law: Marcotte (Respondent banks’ factum), supra, 
note 37, at para. 81. They did not provide a convincing explanation of why provincial contract law 
might not be caught by the preamble as well. 
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provincial law in the particular regulatory context a pre-condition to 
finding a frustration of federal purpose sufficient to invoke the doctrine 
of federal paramountcy. There is support in the Court’s decisions for this 
sort of clear statement argument in the federal paramountcy context. For 
example, in Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan (2005), a 
case involving overlapping federal and provincial tobacco laws, the 
Court said that the courts should not “impute to Parliament … an 
intention to ‘occup[y] the field’ in the absence of very clear statutory 
language to that effect”.170 Nevertheless, this sort of clear statement 
argument has been invoked in the federal paramountcy context 
sporadically at best  and even where invoked, often seems to play a 
secondary role in the Court’s paramountcy analysis. 
The Court’s decision in Marcotte is illustrative. Justices Rothstein 
and Wagner cited with approval the suggestion that a court should not 
“impute to Parliament … an intention to ‘occup[y] the field’ in the 
absence of very clear statutory language to that effect”.171 And they were 
dismissive of any suggestion that Parliament intended to “occupy the 
field” in this context, responding that “[i]f the Banks’ argument amounts 
to claiming that the federal scheme was intended to be a complete code 
to which no other rules at all can be applied, that argument must also fail 
as the federal scheme is dependent on fundamental provincial rules such 
as the basic rules of contract”.172 However, they did not link the 
requirement for “very clear statutory language” with this complete code 
argument, opting instead, as noted, to emphasize the claim that the 
preamble was under-inclusive. 
How might a clear statement rule be incorporated into a federal 
paramountcy analysis?173 The Court’s current analysis puts the burden of 
                                                                                                                       
170 [2005] S.C.J. No. 1, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188, at para. 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rothmans”]. 
See also Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at para. 74 (citing this passage from Rothmans with 
approval). 
A federalism-based clear statement rule is also implicit in the idea, expressed in several cases, 
that it is a “fundamental rule of constitutional interpretation that, ‘[w]hen a federal statute can be 
properly interpreted so as not to interfere with a provincial statute, such an interpretation is to be 
applied in preference to another applicable construction which would bring about a conflict between 
the two statutes’”: Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at para. 75 (citing Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] S.C.J. No. 70, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, at 356 
(S.C.C.)); see also, e.g., Ryan Estate, supra, note 61, at para. 69 (citing this passage from Canadian 
Western Bank). 
171 Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 72. 
172 Id., at para. 79. 
173 There is some support in the academic literature in Canada for importing a clear 
statement rule into the federal paramountcy analysis. For example, Robin Elliot has argued that a 
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proof on the party seeking to invoke the doctrine; in order to establish 
that a provincial law is rendered inoperative due to a frustration of 
federal purpose, that party “must first establish the purpose of the 
relevant federal statute, and then prove that the provincial legislation is 
incompatible with this purpose”.174 A clear statement rule would become 
a new pre-condition, to be considered before a court undertakes this 
analysis. The courts would look for clear statutory language that shows 
that Parliament intended to pre-empt provincial regulation in the field. In 
the absence of clear statutory language, the doctrine of federal 
paramountcy would not be triggered, and the court would not need to go 
on to determine whether the purpose of the federal statute would be 
frustrated by the operation of the provincial law. The clarity of the 
language required might vary with the circumstances, depending, for 
example, on the extent to which provincial regulatory authority was at 
risk of federal override; the greater the potential impact, the greater the 
clarity that might be required to meet a clear statement threshold. 
What would be the benefits of such an approach? The benefits would 
be similar to those discussed earlier in relation to the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity.175 Such an approach would help safeguard 
provincial autonomy, by providing governments notice of, and the 
chance to voice concerns about, the possible pre-emptive effects of 
federal laws, and increasing the enactment costs required to achieve that 
result. This would ensure that provincial laws are not “overridden by 
stealth”, requiring federal legislators to confront the possible pre-emptive 
effects of their laws, and to internalize the risks consequent upon 
pursuing such a course of action.176 It would also mitigate the risks that 
federal paramountcy poses to provincial autonomy in the many  and 
                                                                                                                       
“federal intention to cover the field” should be a “necessary but not a sufficient condition for the 
application of the paramountcy doctrine”: “Safeguarding Provincial Autonomy from the Supreme 
Court’s New Federal Paramountcy Doctrine: A Constructive Role for the Intention to Cover the 
Field Test?” (2007) 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 629, 660 [hereinafter “Elliot, 2007”]. 
There is also judicial and academic support in the United States for a “presumption against pre-
emption” (the equivalent in the United States of federal paramountcy): see, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine 129 
S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009) (U.S.S.C.) (“In all preemption cases, and particularly in those in which 
Congress has ‘legislated … in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,’ … we ‘start with 
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal 
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress’” (emphasis added)); and Young, 
note 139, above. 
174 Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 73 (citing COPA, supra, note 34, at para. 66). 
175 See Part III(1)(c), above. See also Wright, supra, note 88, at 436-40. 
176 Elliot, 2007, supra, note 173, at 664. 
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growing  areas where jurisdiction is now shared.177 In addition, such 
an approach would facilitate deliberation, within and between 
governments, about the potential pre-emptive effect of federal laws, 
capitalizing on the capacity they have to determine whether federal pre-
emption of provincial law is desirable and necessary. Finally, such an 
approach might mitigate the concerns raised about the democratic 
accountability of judicial review, by making the space for, and 
encouraging, democratically accountable deliberation about the division 
of powers.  
True, the importation of this sort of clear statement rule might pose 
real obstacles for the federal government, given the difficulties that 
would accompany any attempt to override provincial law explicitly. In 
addition, it would require the courts to make hard choices, about how, 
and how clearly, the federal government would have to speak to override 
provincial law. But, these are already issues encountered by the federal 
government and the courts. In addition, it would remain open to  
the federal government to override provincial law, by including the 
necessary clear language in the federal law  and increasing the 
enactment costs required to achieve this result is part of the point of a 
clear statement rule. Finally, if we think that the courts have a role to 
play in division of powers cases, including by safeguarding provincial 
autonomy, hard choices may go with the territory. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court has tended, in recent years, to adopt an approach in 
division of powers cases that favours overlapping federal and provincial 
laws. However, it has not eschewed jurisdictional limits altogether.178 
The challenge for governments and litigants has been to predict when the 
Court will be inclined to abandon its general preference for jurisdictional 
overlap and enforce jurisdictional limits. In Marcotte, the banks urged 
the Court to embrace an exclusive jurisdictional enclave in relation to 
“banking”, while the plaintiffs urged the Court to embrace jurisdictional 
overlap, allowing for federal and provincial regulation of “banking”. The 
plaintiffs won the day. The Court’s decision is a ringing statement of an 
approach that welcomes jurisdictional overlap, and thus “favours, where 
                                                                                                                       
177 Wright, supra, note 88, at 309-11 (discussing the rise in shared jurisdiction). 
178 For discussion, see id., at 278-97. 
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possible, the application [and operation] of statutes enacted by both 
levels of government”.179 
This article has explored the Court’s decision in Marcotte. It has 
argued that the Court was right to reject the banks’ argument that this 
was not a case where it was “possible” to “favour … the application [and 
operation] of [the consumer protection laws] of both levels of 
government”, leaving potential conflicts to be worked out in future cases. 
It thus defends the Court’s decision to reject the banks’ argument that the 
relevant requirements in Quebec’s consumer protection legislation were 
constitutionally inapplicable under the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity or constitutionally inoperative under the doctrine of federal 
paramountcy. However, it has challenged aspects of the reasoning 
provided by the Court in relation to both doctrines. It has argued that 
these weaknesses could be addressed (or mitigated) by a federalism-
based clear statement rule, which requires a government to use clear 
language when it pursues initiatives with certain implications for the 
division of powers. 
The role that federalism-based clear statement rules might play in 
safeguarding Canada’s federalism system has not been adequately 
explored. The focus of the debate for decades, inside and outside of the 
courts, has been on whether, and when, the courts should enforce hard 
jurisdictional limits. This article has attempted to illustrate  in broad 
outline only  why it might be worthwhile if more of the attention now 
shifted to discussing the potential role of federalism-based clear 
statement rules. 
                                                                                                                       
179 Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 63. 
 
